Table
B1 | B2 | |
A1 | (-4*,-4•) | (1*,-6) |
A2 | (-6,1•) | (0,0) |
NE of stage game : (A1,B1)
B) if game is repeated for a limited time period, such that the end period of game is known,
Then in every period, only NE of stage game is played, if the game has only one NE
Bcoz both players know, that in end period, 10th Period, only Credible NE is played : (A1,B1)
So in penultimate period, 9th Period, nobody will Cooperate, since in 10th Period, only NE is played
Similarly if we move backwards , in every period, only NE could be played only
ii) in neither of the rouds, that players can credibly commit to play (A1,B1)
c) yes, (A2,B2) could be sustained as SPNE in every period
ii) let discount factor : d
For P1, Cooperation payoff
3. Consider the game illustrated by the payoff matrix below: Jeffrey B1 B2 -4,- 4 1...
4 Game Theory II (40 points) Using the following infromation about normal-form game payoff matrix to answer the questions from (a) to (). Tony Confess Silent (4,-1) (3,3) (11) (-14) Confess Jane Silent (a) Identify pure strategy NE. What is the name for this type of game? What is the main issue of this game? (4 points) (b) Suppose this game is repeated infinitely and each time the probability of game end in that game is 1 -g where 0<8<1...
Consider the competitive, static, one-time game depicted in the following figure. If larger payoffs are preferred, does either player have a dominant strategy? If B believes that A will move A1, how should B move? If B believes that A will move A2, how should B move? What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile if this game is played just once? What is the strategy profile for this game if both players adopt a secure strategy? What strategy profile results...
5. Consider the payoff matrix below, which shows two players each with three strategies. Player 2 A2 B2 C2 A1 20, 22 24, 20 25, 24 B1 23,26 21,24 22, 23 C1 19, 25 23,17 26,26 Player1 STUDENT NUMBER: SECTION: Page 11 of 12 pages Find all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this simultaneous choice, one play game. Explain your reasoning. a) b) Draw the game in extended form and solve assuming sequential choice, with player 2 choosing first.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to a. 2/3. b. (C,E) cannot be part of a SPNE. c. 1/7. d. 1/3. e. 3/7.
Please help me Game theory !!! 10minutes left. Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to a. 2/3. b. (C,E) cannot be part of a SPNE. c. 1/7. d. 1/3. e. 3/7. Player 2 D EF A 11,11,1 Player I B 1,8 7,51,1 C5,78,31,1
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D EF A 1,1 1,11,1 PlayerI B 1,8 7,51,1 c | 5,7 | 8,3 | 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (B,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to Ob. 1/3 ос. 37
4. Consider the following game that is played T times. First, players move simultaneously and independently. Then each player is informed about the actions taken by the other player in the first play and, given this, they play it again, and so on. The payoff for the whole game is the sum of the payoffs a player obtains in the T plays of the game A 3,1 4,0 0,1 В 1,5 2,2 0,1 C 1,1 0,2 1,2 (a) (10%) Suppose...
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times Player 2 D EF A 1,1 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to C. 1/3 d. (CE) cannot be part of a SPNE.
Consider the stage game below, and suppose it is repeated infinitely many times. Player 2 DEF A 1, 1,1 1,1 Player I B 1,8 7,5 1,1 C 5,7 8,3 1,1 To sustain a SPNE in which players play (C,E) in every period by means of a trigger strategy, the discount rate must be larger than or equal to O a. 1/3 O b. 2/3 O d. (C,E)cannot be part of a SPNE
1. Consider the following normal form game: 112 L CR T 10 102 12 0 13 M 12 25 5 0 0 B|13 010 011 a) (Level A) First suppose this game is played only once. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria? (b) (Level B) Now suppose this game is played twice. Players observe the actions chosen in the first period prior to the second period. Each player's total payoff is the sum of his/her payoff in the two...