Homework Answers
Player1, A is dominant strategy ( 3,4,1) > (2,3, -1) , and (1,2,0)
Player 2, F is dominant strategy (4,1,2,) >(2,0-1) and (3,0,1)
Answer: Strategy A for player 1 and strategy F for player 2
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Player E A Player 3,3 4,2 1,4 2,0 3,0 -1,1 1,1 C 2,-1 0,2 The iterative...
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player...
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player Consider the game above. Select all that apply. a Strategy B weakly dominates C. Strategy D weakly dominates E. c. The game does not have a dominant strategy solution. d. F is a dominant strategy. e. (A,D) is the dominant strategy solution.
Player ll E F GH A 10,0 9,09,1 17-2 Player B 8,3 13,3 10,4 15,2 С...
Player ll E F GH A 10,0 9,09,1 17-2 Player B 8,3 13,3 10,4 15,2 С 7,6 12,2 9,2 14,1 D 9,0 10,5 9,6 15,5 for Player 1 and The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy strategy for Player 2.
1. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form: T4,5 3,0 0,2 M 5,2 2, 1,0 B0,02,84,2...
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1. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form: T4,5 3,0 0,2 M 5,2 2, 1,0 B0,02,84,2 (a) What strategies are rationalizable? (b) What strategies survive the iterative elimination of strictly dominant strategies? (c) What strategies are ruled out by the assumption of rationality alone (i.e, without the assumption of common knowledge)? (d) Find all pure-strategy nash equilibria.
1. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form: T4,5...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3...
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3 2,0 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1...
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 Water 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 ROWENA Wind 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 Fire 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 124 [CH. 4] SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Does either Rowena or Colin have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. (b) Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. Give the order in which the eliminations occur and give the...
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For...
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For each one, identify which strategies are non-rationalizable (if any), and which strategies are strictly dominated (if any). Do this for both players in each game. Note: You don't need to use IESDS or IENBR in this problem: I only want to know which strategies are strictly dominated or non-rationalizable in the games as presented. Rogers Go Rogue Go Legit 2,3 3,4 3,2 5,1 3,1...
4. [20] Answer the following. (a) [4] Explain the difference between a strategy that is a...
4. [20] Answer the following. (a) [4] Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F G A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 89 8,5 2,8 5,2 C | 0.10 | 7.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F C A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 8,9 8,5 2,8 5,2 C 0,10 7,01,9 2,2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
QUESTTON 4 Player Il E D A 3,34,21,4 B 2,0 3,0-1,1 с 1,1 2,1 0,2 Player Consider the game above. Select all that apply. a Strategy B weakly dominates C. Strategy D weakly dominates E. c. The game does not have a dominant strategy solution. d. F is a dominant strategy. e. (A,D) is the dominant strategy solution.
Player ll E F GH A 10,0 9,09,1 17-2 Player B 8,3 13,3 10,4 15,2 С 7,6 12,2 9,2 14,1 D 9,0 10,5 9,6 15,5 for Player 1 and The iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS) solution is the strategy profile consisting in strategy strategy for Player 2.
Hello tutor,
Could you help me with this question ASAP
Thank you.
1. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form: T4,5 3,0 0,2 M 5,2 2, 1,0 B0,02,84,2 (a) What strategies are rationalizable? (b) What strategies survive the iterative elimination of strictly dominant strategies? (c) What strategies are ruled out by the assumption of rationality alone (i.e, without the assumption of common knowledge)? (d) Find all pure-strategy nash equilibria.
1. Consider the following two-player game in strategic form: T4,5...
Player lI C D E A 0,0 0,2 2,1 В 1,2 1,1 0,0 Player B Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply. Strategy A is not dominant for Player 1. Strategy B is weakly dominant for player I. Strategy E is dominated by strategies C and D for player 2. Strategy E is never a best response.
DLM R A 2,3 -1,0 1,1 B -1,3 3,0 2,1 C 0,0 0,10 3,1 D 4,3 2,0 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 Water 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 ROWENA Wind 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 Fire 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 124 [CH. 4] SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Does either Rowena or Colin have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. (b) Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. Give the order in which the eliminations occur and give the...
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For each one, identify which strategies are non-rationalizable (if any), and which strategies are strictly dominated (if any). Do this for both players in each game. Note: You don't need to use IESDS or IENBR in this problem: I only want to know which strategies are strictly dominated or non-rationalizable in the games as presented. Rogers Go Rogue Go Legit 2,3 3,4 3,2 5,1 3,1...
4. [20] Answer the following. (a) [4] Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F G A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 89 8,5 2,8 5,2 C | 0.10 | 7.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F C A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 8,9 8,5 2,8 5,2 C 0,10 7,01,9 2,2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
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