Question

Question 13a: On the same graph, draw the typical Best Response Functions (BRF) for two Cournot firms. Question 13b: Draw the
0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

Answer 13a :-

(4- 0419२) ga (Qu करे।

Latest understand the concept of best response function by looking at the above graph where there are two firms represented by firm 1 and firm 2 and producing Q1 and Q2 quantities respectively . The firms are choosing output simultaneously and neither firm knows the others output before choosing its own.

Max : P*Q -c*q1

Where P = a-b *Q ,

and Q = q1 + q2 and

c = the marginal cost of the specific firm .

So substitute in the equations for P and Q to get :-

Max :( a-b ( q1+q2))q1-cq1

Or Max :(aq1 - bq21 - bq1q2 - cq1)

partialMax /partialq1 : a-2bq1-bq2-c =0

Best response function :-

q1 = ((a-c)-bq2)/2b

Answer 13b :-

(4-0)

In the above graph there are two firms, firm 1 and firm 2 producing goods Q1 and Q2 respectively . In the cournot's model ,a firm's best response function comes from MR =MC. If MC Falls then the firms best response function will shift. Now let us consider that firm two's marginal cost has been lowered. The best responses to the above situation is that firm one will not change its best response however the firm two's marginal cost curve has decreased ,however its marginal revenue curve remains unaffected .So firm 2 will shift its best response function to the right it as it will want to produce more than before for any given level of firms one's output. This will shift the Nash cournot equilibrium from E1 to E2 As given in the graph above.

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
Question 13a: On the same graph, draw the typical Best Response Functions (BRF) for two Cournot...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • Question 16: In a Cournot market, use the Best Response Functions for firms one and two...

    Question 16: In a Cournot market, use the Best Response Functions for firms one and two to explain why collusion (i.e., the market output being equal to the monopoly level) is so hard to maintain.

  • 9. Given Firm 1's best-response curve, show how Firm 2's best-response curve shifts on a graph...

    9. Given Firm 1's best-response curve, show how Firm 2's best-response curve shifts on a graph if its marginal cost changes from m to m+x. Show how the Nash-Cournot equilibrium changes as Firm 2's marginal cost increases. O O Initially, assume the marginal cost for both firms is m, resulting in the best-response functions shown in the graph. 3 Now assume that the second firm's marginal cost of production changes from m to m + x 1.) Using the line...

  • Cournot: Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms A and B simultaneously choose quantity. Both firms...

    Cournot: Consider a Cournot duopoly in which firms A and B simultaneously choose quantity. Both firms have constant marginal cost of $20 and zero fixed cost. Market demand is given by: P = 140 − qA − qB. (a) Derive the best-response functions for each firm and plot them on the same graph. (b) Calculate the profits of each firm in the Nash Equilibrium outcome.

  • In the market of cournot competition, the aggregate market demand is P 100 4Q a. There...

    In the market of cournot competition, the aggregate market demand is P 100 4Q a. There exists two firms in the market, with identical production technology, i.e. mci = m2-20. Calculate the cournot equilibrium in this case. Also, draw the best response functions for firm 1 and firm 2 in the((2) plane b. There exists two firms in the market, with different production technology, i.e. mci = 10 and m2-30. Calculate the cournot equilibrium in this case. Also, draw the...

  • This question is one question. Thank you. 5 Cournot Suppose there are two departments selling economics...

    This question is one question. Thank you. 5 Cournot Suppose there are two departments selling economics degrees in one market competing fol- lowing the rules of the Cournot Oligopoly Model econ and man. econ. Suppose market demand for an economics degree is 7200-2p. Suppose both departments marginal cost is $3000 per degree. What is each department's residual demand curve? 5.1 5.2 What is each department's best response functions? 5.3 What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in this market? What is the...

  • please answer all 10 questions thanks Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm...

    please answer all 10 questions thanks Suppose there are only two firms in the marker, firm A and firm B. They produce identical products. Firm A and firm B have the same constant marginal cost, MCA = MCB = ACA = ACB = 25. The market demand function is given by Q = 400 – 4P. a. If the firms practice under the Bertrand model, what will be the Nash equilibrium market price and output level? b. If these two...

  • Exercise 5: Two oligopolistic firms compete in the same market as in Exercise 1 where the...

    Exercise 5: Two oligopolistic firms compete in the same market as in Exercise 1 where the demand function is 4800 80p. The two firms can expand their output at a constant marginal and average cost of 305 (1) Fill the second column of table 1 with the values for the market price corresponding to each value of the overall quantity produced in the market. (2) Draw in diagram 1 the marginal cost, the market demand and the marginal revenue at...

  • 2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's...

    2. (Cournot Model) Consider a Cournot duopoly. The market demand is p=160 - q2. Firm 1's marginal cost is 10, and firm 2's marginal cost is also 10. There are no fixed costs. A. Derive each firm's best response function B. What is the Nash equilibrium of this model? Find the equilibrium market price. C. Find the equilibrium profit for each firm D. Find the equilibrium consumer surplus in this market. 3. (Bertrand Model) Consider a Bertrand duopoly. The market...

  • Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market...

    Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q=18-P) with the same cost (C(Q)=1/2 *Q^2). Set up firm 1’s profit maximization. Solve for firm 1’s best response function. Solve for firm 1’s quantity, firm 2’s quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. Is this a Nash equilibrium? Do consumers prefer the Cournot competition equilibrium over the collusion of the two firms...

  • 3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the...

    3. Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (C(Q)=Q2). a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity, the equilibrium market quantity, and price. Show your work. d. Is this a Nash equilibrium? e. Do consumers prefer the Cournot...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT