Can backward induction be readily applied when a sequential game is presented as a payoff matrix? Discuss.
Yes, backward induction can be applied readily when a sequential game is presented as a payoff matrix. Backward induction, like all game theory, uses the assumptions of rationality and maximization, meaning that Player 2 will maximize his payoff in any given situation. Moreover the backward induction requires sequential rationality which indicates that the players should play optimally at every point in the game
For example: In a below there is a sequential game between two players. The Player 1 makes the first decision (right or left) and Player 2 makes its decision after Player 1 (down or up). If we eliminate the choices that Player 2 will not choose, thus can narrow down the tree; and now will bold the lines that maximize the player's payoff at the provided information set. Thus the result is an equilibrium found by backwards induction of Player 1 selecting the "right" and Player 2 selecting "up"
Can backward induction be readily applied when a sequential game is presented as a payoff matrix?...
Are the subgames of a sequential game visible when the entire game is presented in strategic form? Explain.
Are the subgames of a sequential game visible when the entire game is presented in strategic form? Explain.
Identify the definition for each term from the following list. 1. Payoff-matrix format 2. Game-tree format 3. A junction on a game tree. 4. One of the final outcomes of a game tree. 5. Divides the overall game tree into nested subgames before working backward from right to left. 6. A mini-game within the overall game. 7. The process of backward induction that relies on both firms having perfect information about the decisions made in each subgame. 8. A statement...
Solve game by backward induction using the normal form
in the future and past?
UJ SIuer the following game between Barban and you in extensive-form 200 100,100 200,0 200,0 Barbara 0,200 150, 150 300,0 0.200 0,300 200 200 reject Barbara accept 400
Solve the following Extensive Form game by Backward Induction,
then covert them into Normal Form and find the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria in Normal Form.
P1 V P2 (2, 2) P1 (1,3) B (3,4) (4,2)
bi + b2 + b3) otherwise. . Assume 2Vs > L >202 Find a SPE of the game using Backward induction. 2. (20 points) Consider the infinite period 2 player alternating offer bar- gaining model with constants and identical discount factor 0< < Carefully explain what will be a SPE of the game
bi + b2 + b3) otherwise. . Assume 2Vs > L >202 Find a SPE of the game using Backward induction. 2. (20 points) Consider the infinite...
Problem 3 Consider the following sequential game between Kate and Nate. They each have to choose between two possible actions: work early (E) or work late (L) and Kate plays first. The payoffs are • (EL) = (0,2) . (E, E) = (3.3) . (LE) = (2.0) . (L.L) = (1,1) Express the game in a tree form and find the Nash equilibrium using backward induction
6. Given the payoff matrix is the expected value of the game? Which player does the game favor? termine the optimal mixed strategy for player R (rows). What x 2 2
6. Given the payoff matrix is the expected value of the game? Which player does the game favor? termine the optimal mixed strategy for player R (rows). What x 2 2
4 Game Theory II (40 points) Using the following infromation about normal-form game payoff matrix to answer the questions from (a) to (). Tony Confess Silent (4,-1) (3,3) (11) (-14) Confess Jane Silent (a) Identify pure strategy NE. What is the name for this type of game? What is the main issue of this game? (4 points) (b) Suppose this game is repeated infinitely and each time the probability of game end in that game is 1 -g where 0<8<1...
Description -/3 points 7 Calculate the expected payoff of the game with payoff matrix 30 -1 -1 0 0 -2 -3 0 0 2 4 1 -2 1 NN using the mixed strategies supplied. HINT (See Example 1.) R = [0 0 0 1], C = [0 0 1 0] Submit Answer