Are the subgames of a sequential game visible when the entire game is presented in strategic...

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Are the subgames of a sequential game visible when the entire game is presented in strategic...

Are the subgames of a sequential game visible when the entire game is presented in strategic form? Explain.

business economics

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Answer 1

Answer #1

Yes.

This is because in strategic form game, one can see what the other player will do and has strategies to play, in case the other player plays any specific strategy.

Though a strategically presented game will chose a simultaneous game structure, one can still make out the moves and payoffs of one player when the other player plays one strategy before him.

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Answer 2

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Are the subgames of a sequential game visible when the entire game is presented in strategic...

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