given data
x:y:z = a:b:c
a) true
b) false
c) true
or 5. 1. Consider the following game tree. In this tree, a player, say Player 3,...
Q1. Suppose two players, First and Second, take part in a sequential-move game. First moves first, Second moves second, and each player moves only once. (a). Draw a game tree for a game in which First has two possible actions (Up or Down), and Second has three possible actions (Top, Middle, or Bottom) at each node. Show which nodes are terminal/decision and write down all the (pure) strategies of each player. (b). Draw a game tree for a game in...
5. Consider the game given in the adjoining (Figure 1). Player l's actions in the initial node o are X and E. At the node c, player 1 has two actions 1 and r. Player 2's actions at the node a are li and r1. Player 2's available actions at the node b are l2 and r2. The payoffs are given in the terminal nodes. The first entry in any payoff vector corresponds to the paoff to player 1, and...
Give an example of an ((extensive form)) game with 2 players. In all steps each player has two options. Player I decides in step 1 and step 3. Player II decides in step 2. Player 2 has perfect information. In step 3 player I has forgotten the decision in step 1 and has imperfect information in step 2.
Q3 Three-Player Game Consider a 3-player matrix game. The correct interpretation is as follows: the row indicates which strategy was chosen by player I; the column indicates which strategy was chosen by player II. If player III chooses strategy X, then the three players' payoffs are given by the first matrix; if player III chooses strategy Y , then the three players' payoffs are given by the second matrix. II II LR 4, 7, 5 8, 1, 3 1, 1,8...
led Notes Problem.4: Strategies and Subgames (4 pts) Consider the following game tree: The payoffs in this game tree have been left blank, because they will not matter in this question. Additionally, the decision nodes have been marked so that they can be referred to easily: 1A,1B. IC, and ID are all decision nodes belonging to Player 1, while 2A, 2B, and 2C all belong to Player 2. a) How many strategies does each player have? (Remember that a strategy...
GAME MATRIX Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Consider two players (Rose as player...
Question 3 Consider the game in figure 3. Player 2 LR 3,3 1,4 Player 1 4,1 2,2 Figure 3: A Prisoner's Dilemma game. Assume that the payoffs in the figure are $ values. (i) Assume that both players have risk neutral utility functions. Find all of the Nash equilibria of this game. (ii) Next, assume that the row player has other regarding preferences with a = 0 and B = 3 (while the column player has the same preferences as...
QUESTION 8 Consider a game with two players, players and player 2. Player 1's strategies are up and down, and player 2's strategies are left and right. Suppose that player 1's payoff function is such that for any combination of the players chosen strategies, player 1 always receives a payoff equal to 0. Suppose further that player 2's payoff function is such that no two combinations of the players' chosen strategies ever give player 2 the same payoff Choose the...
Consider a variant of the Nim game called "Stones". Suppose that initially there is a single pile of 5 stones and two players, I and II. Each player takes turns picking up either 1 or 2 stones from the pile. Player I moves first, then Player II, then Player I, etc. until all stones have been picked up 3. Assuming that the loser is the player who picks up the last stone, write the game of Stones out in extensive...
Homework #1 Consider a 3-player setting in which player 1 moves first by choosing among three actions: a, b, and c. After observing the choice of player 1, player 2 chooses among two actions: x and y. 1. Consider the following three variants as to what player 3 can do and what she knows when she moves: If player 1 chose a, then (after player 2 made his choice) player 3 selects among two actions: high and low. Player 3...