Question

Consider the following workplace scenario for the next two questions. Kris and Jane are two work colleagues who simultaneously choose between working Hard and being Lazy. If they both work Hard each player gets 0. If both are Lazy each party again get zero. If Kris works Hard and Jane is Lazy Kris gets 3 and Jane gets a payoff of 6. If Kris is Lazy and Jane works Hard the payoffs are 5 and 5 to Kris and Jane respectively. 6. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria in the game. a. (Lazy, Lazy), where the first term refers to Kris's strategy and the second term refers to Jane's. b. (Hard, Hard) c. (Lazy, Lazy) and (Hard, Hard) d. (Lazy, Hard) e. (Lazy, Hard) and (Hard, Lazy) 7. What is the mixed strategy equilibrium, where a is the probability that Kris plays Hard and B is the probability that Jane plays Hard a. (a = 7/10, B = 1/2) b. (a = 1/2, B = 3/4) c. (a = 3/10, B = 5/11) d. (a = 5/11, B = 3/8) e. (a = 4/7, B = 3/9)

Answer 1

Tane HARD LAZY Kms HARD TM Rbove Mati knsh uoves wi HARD JANE iu reapond hit Larg Ib kws Selects tu han Jane wiu respond witu HARD Knsh all responds in inilar manmr. Hente, Nash equlibium a (LAZY,HARD)HAR,L5y) Ans ce) -8) (50 H L 316 5,5 (L-9L Knsh 75 & xot 1) X3 = Bx5+ (1-2)%0 b+3-38= 5B0 3 = 86 JANE 6 xa t1-4)0 bxat l-)5 = Ct5-54= 5-119 a 5 A: d)