When used-car dealers signal the quality of a used car with a warranty, _______. A. it...
When used-car dealers signal the quality of a used car with a warranty, _______. A. it is not rational to believe the signal because some used-car dealers are crooked B. the price of a lemon rises above the price of a good used car because warranty costs on lemons are greater than warranty costs on good used cars C. the demand for lemons is eliminated D. buyers believe the signal because the cost of a false signal is high
Homework Answers
Ans) Lemons problem tend to arise when it is hard to differentiate between reliable products and lemons (defective product). When dealer of the car gives guarantee, it signals that it is not selling lemons.
A signal is effective when it is costly otherwise everyone can use it and hence it will be of no use.
Option d.
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When used-car dealers signal the quality of a used car with a
warranty, _______. A. it...
Read Eye on the Market for Used Cars, and then explain how a warranty signals that...
Read Eye on the Market for Used Cars, and then explain how a warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon and why it is in a used-car dealer's self-interest to offer a warranty. A warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon because A. giving warranties on lemons results in dealers bearing a high cost of repair O B. "lemon laws" require dealers to honor warranties O C. a warranty creates asymmetric information O D. private sellers, who sell...
Warranties work as signals in the used car market because _______. A. buyers want to believe...
Warranties work as signals in the used car market because _______. A. buyers want to believe they're getting a good deal B. all car dealers are more interested in their customers than in their own profit C. buyers are not sophisticated enough to distinguish an honest dealer from a dishonest one D. a dealer who sells a lemon with a warranty ends up paying a big repair bill, so dealers are careful to avoid selling lemons The principle of ______...
Suppose that everyone in a used-car example is risk neutral, potential car buyers value lemons at...
Suppose that everyone in a used-car example is risk neutral, potential car buyers value lemons at $1,500 and good used cars at $2,200, the reservation price of lemon owners is $500, and the reservation price of owners of high-quality used cars is $2,000. The share of current owners who have lemons is 0. For what values of 0 do all the potential sellers sell their used cars? Describe the equilibrium. The most a risk-neutral buyer would be willing to pay...
can someone explain how to work out part b *edit*: better picture 1. Consider the market for used cars shown in the figure below. The left panel (a) shows the market for low-quality cars (lemo...
can someone explain how to work out part b
*edit*: better picture
1. Consider the market for used cars shown in the figure below. The left panel (a) shows the market for low-quality cars (lemons); the right panel (b) shows the market for high-quality cars (plums). If all buyers and sellers had full information about the quality of automobiles being offered for sale, lemons would sell for $8,000 and plums would sell for $16,000. Price,() (S/car) (a) Lemons (b) Plums...
When dealers provide warranties in a used-car market OA. the outcome is inefficient B. the outcome...
When dealers provide warranties in a used-car market OA. the outcome is inefficient B. the outcome is a pooling equilibrium C. the outcome is a separating equilibrium O D. buyers don't always believe the signal because the cost of sending a false signal is low
1. Suppose there are two kinds of used cars, good cars and lemons. A good car...
1. Suppose there are two kinds of used cars, good cars and lemons. A good car is worth $10,000, and a lemon is worth $2,000. Owners of used cars know where the car is good or bad, but potential buyers do not. (a) Supposing half of all cars are good and half are lemons, what is the expected value of a used car of unknown quality? (b) Based on your answer to part (a), do you expect owners of used...
Suppose there are 50 sellers of cars in a used car market who know the quality...
Suppose there are 50 sellers of cars in a used car market who know the quality of their car. Of these 50 sellers, 25 own plums. Each owner of a plum is willing to sell her car as long as she receives at least $4000 for it. The remaining sellers own lemons, which each would be willing to sell for at least $2000. There are also 50 potential buyers. a) Suppose that each buyer is willing to pay up to...
What's the answer for both Qs There are many buyers who value high-quality used cars at...
What's the answer for both Qs
There are many buyers who value high-quality used cars at the full-information market price of p, and lemons at P2. There are a limited number of potential sellers who value high-quality cars at V1 spand lemons at V2 =p2. Everyone is risk neutral. The share of lemons among all the used cars that might potentially be sold is 0. Assume P4 > P2, V7 > V2. Further, suppose that the buyers incur a transaction...
Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles...
Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential buyers. Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be a low-quality "lemon." Instructions: Enter your answers as whole numbers. a. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad...
The lemons problem gives the owners of above-average-quality used cars an incentive to: A. offer a...
The lemons problem gives the owners of above-average-quality used cars an incentive to: A. offer a warranty when selling their cars. B. ask for a sales price that is higher than the blue book value of their car. C. exaggerate the quality of their cars when selling them. D. understate the true quality of their cars when selling them
Read Eye on the Market for Used Cars, and then explain how a warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon and why it is in a used-car dealer's self-interest to offer a warranty. A warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon because A. giving warranties on lemons results in dealers bearing a high cost of repair O B. "lemon laws" require dealers to honor warranties O C. a warranty creates asymmetric information O D. private sellers, who sell...
Suppose that everyone in a used-car example is risk neutral, potential car buyers value lemons at $1,500 and good used cars at $2,200, the reservation price of lemon owners is $500, and the reservation price of owners of high-quality used cars is $2,000. The share of current owners who have lemons is 0. For what values of 0 do all the potential sellers sell their used cars? Describe the equilibrium. The most a risk-neutral buyer would be willing to pay...
can someone explain how to work out part b
*edit*: better picture
1. Consider the market for used cars shown in the figure below. The left panel (a) shows the market for low-quality cars (lemons); the right panel (b) shows the market for high-quality cars (plums). If all buyers and sellers had full information about the quality of automobiles being offered for sale, lemons would sell for $8,000 and plums would sell for $16,000. Price,() (S/car) (a) Lemons (b) Plums...
When dealers provide warranties in a used-car market OA. the outcome is inefficient B. the outcome is a pooling equilibrium C. the outcome is a separating equilibrium O D. buyers don't always believe the signal because the cost of sending a false signal is low
What's the answer for both Qs
There are many buyers who value high-quality used cars at the full-information market price of p, and lemons at P2. There are a limited number of potential sellers who value high-quality cars at V1 spand lemons at V2 =p2. Everyone is risk neutral. The share of lemons among all the used cars that might potentially be sold is 0. Assume P4 > P2, V7 > V2. Further, suppose that the buyers incur a transaction...
Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential buyers. Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be a low-quality "lemon." Instructions: Enter your answers as whole numbers. a. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad...
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