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Read Eye on the Market for Used Cars, and then explain how a warranty signals that a car isnt a lemon and why it is in a use

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Answer #1

- A. giving warranties on lemons results in dealers bearing a high cost of repair.

- B. Buyers believe the signal given by a warranty and are willing to pay a higher price for used cars with warranties.

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