Consider the market for used cars. The overall population of used cars is a fraction p...
Consider the market for used cars. The overall population of used cars is a fraction p plums and a fraction 1 ? p lemons. Used car sellers value plums at $2,000 and lemons at $1,000. Used car buyers value plums at $2,400 and lemons at $1,200. There is asymmetric information. The seller of a car knows the type of the car and the potential buyer does not. Market equilibrium is defined as a Nash equilibrium.
a) Suppose p = 0.5. What is the market equilibrium price. What
kinds of cars are traded in the equilibrium? (Nash
equilibrium)
b) Suppose p = 0.8. What are the possible market equilibria (Nash
equilibria)? What kinds of cars are traded in the equilibria?
(hint: it is on purpose that the question uses the plural for
possible equilibria).
Homework Answers
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Consider the market for used cars. The overall population of
used cars is a fraction p...
can someone explain how to work out part b *edit*: better picture 1. Consider the market for used cars shown in the figure below. The left panel (a) shows the market for low-quality cars (lemo...
can someone explain how to work out part b
*edit*: better picture
1. Consider the market for used cars shown in the figure below. The left panel (a) shows the market for low-quality cars (lemons); the right panel (b) shows the market for high-quality cars (plums). If all buyers and sellers had full information about the quality of automobiles being offered for sale, lemons would sell for $8,000 and plums would sell for $16,000. Price,() (S/car) (a) Lemons (b) Plums...
Consider the market for used cars in which ? of the cars are good cars (peaches)...
Consider the market for used cars in which ? of the cars are good cars (peaches) and (1 − ?) are bad cars (lemons); buyers think ? of the cars for sale are peaches and (1 − ?) are lemons (? and ? are fractions). Sellers’ valuations of peaches and lemons are $20 and $10, respectively; buyers’ valuations of peaches and lemons are $50 and $15, respectively. All sellers and buyers are risk neutral. This information is common knowledge. (a)...
Suppose there are 50 sellers of cars in a used car market who know the quality...
Suppose there are 50 sellers of cars in a used car market who know the quality of their car. Of these 50 sellers, 25 own plums. Each owner of a plum is willing to sell her car as long as she receives at least $4000 for it. The remaining sellers own lemons, which each would be willing to sell for at least $2000. There are also 50 potential buyers. a) Suppose that each buyer is willing to pay up to...
Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles...
Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential buyers. Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be a low-quality "lemon." Instructions: Enter your answers as whole numbers. a. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad...
Suppose the market for used cars has 75 sellers with cars in good condition and 25 sellers with cars in bad condition (...
Suppose the market for used cars has 75 sellers with cars in
good condition and 25 sellers with cars in bad condition
("lemons").
5. Suppose the market for used cars has 75 sellers with cars in good condition and 25 sellers with cars in bad condition ("lemons"). There are an unlimited number of potential buyers. Buyers are willing to pay $10,000 for cars in good condition while the sellers value these cars at $7,000. Buyers are willing to pay $300...
Suppose there are 100 sellers, each offering one used car, and 200 buyers, each wanting one...
Suppose there are 100 sellers, each offering one used car, and 200 buyers, each wanting one used car. A used car could be of high or low quality. There are 50 high-quality cars and 50 low-quality cars. A high-quality used car is worth $10,000 to the buyer whereas a low-quality used car is worth $2,0000 to the buyer. A seller knows the car’s quality. (a) Suppose a buyer can observe the car’s quality. What is the buyer’s maximum willingness to...
Please help with these two questions QUESTION 5 Assume that there is a market for used cars where there are only two t...
Please help with these two questions
QUESTION 5 Assume that there is a market for used cars where there are only two types of cars: good cars and bad cars. Below is the full information for consumers and sellers Demand for good cars is: Q = 50 if PS$200 Q 0, otherwise Demand for bad cars is: 50 if PS $80 Q = Q 0, otherwise Supply for good cars is: Q 75 if P2 $150 =0 otherwise Q Supply...
Read Eye on the Market for Used Cars, and then explain how a warranty signals that...
Read Eye on the Market for Used Cars, and then explain how a warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon and why it is in a used-car dealer's self-interest to offer a warranty. A warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon because A. giving warranties on lemons results in dealers bearing a high cost of repair O B. "lemon laws" require dealers to honor warranties O C. a warranty creates asymmetric information O D. private sellers, who sell...
Suppose that everyone in a used-car example is risk neutral, potential car buyers value lemons at...
Suppose that everyone in a used-car example is risk neutral, potential car buyers value lemons at $1,500 and good used cars at $2,200, the reservation price of lemon owners is $500, and the reservation price of owners of high-quality used cars is $2,000. The share of current owners who have lemons is 0. For what values of 0 do all the potential sellers sell their used cars? Describe the equilibrium. The most a risk-neutral buyer would be willing to pay...
1. Suppose there are two kinds of used cars, good cars and lemons. A good car...
1. Suppose there are two kinds of used cars, good cars and lemons. A good car is worth $10,000, and a lemon is worth $2,000. Owners of used cars know where the car is good or bad, but potential buyers do not. (a) Supposing half of all cars are good and half are lemons, what is the expected value of a used car of unknown quality? (b) Based on your answer to part (a), do you expect owners of used...
can someone explain how to work out part b
*edit*: better picture
1. Consider the market for used cars shown in the figure below. The left panel (a) shows the market for low-quality cars (lemons); the right panel (b) shows the market for high-quality cars (plums). If all buyers and sellers had full information about the quality of automobiles being offered for sale, lemons would sell for $8,000 and plums would sell for $16,000. Price,() (S/car) (a) Lemons (b) Plums...
Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential buyers. Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be a low-quality "lemon." Instructions: Enter your answers as whole numbers. a. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market and that good used cars are worth $13,000 while bad...
Suppose the market for used cars has 75 sellers with cars in
good condition and 25 sellers with cars in bad condition
("lemons").
5. Suppose the market for used cars has 75 sellers with cars in good condition and 25 sellers with cars in bad condition ("lemons"). There are an unlimited number of potential buyers. Buyers are willing to pay $10,000 for cars in good condition while the sellers value these cars at $7,000. Buyers are willing to pay $300...
Please help with these two questions
QUESTION 5 Assume that there is a market for used cars where there are only two types of cars: good cars and bad cars. Below is the full information for consumers and sellers Demand for good cars is: Q = 50 if PS$200 Q 0, otherwise Demand for bad cars is: 50 if PS $80 Q = Q 0, otherwise Supply for good cars is: Q 75 if P2 $150 =0 otherwise Q Supply...
Read Eye on the Market for Used Cars, and then explain how a warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon and why it is in a used-car dealer's self-interest to offer a warranty. A warranty signals that a car isn't a lemon because A. giving warranties on lemons results in dealers bearing a high cost of repair O B. "lemon laws" require dealers to honor warranties O C. a warranty creates asymmetric information O D. private sellers, who sell...
Suppose that everyone in a used-car example is risk neutral, potential car buyers value lemons at $1,500 and good used cars at $2,200, the reservation price of lemon owners is $500, and the reservation price of owners of high-quality used cars is $2,000. The share of current owners who have lemons is 0. For what values of 0 do all the potential sellers sell their used cars? Describe the equilibrium. The most a risk-neutral buyer would be willing to pay...
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