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Suppose the market for used cars has 75 sellers with cars in good condition and 25 sellers with cars in bad condition ("lemons").
5. Suppose the market for used cars has 75 sellers with cars in good condition and 25 sellers with cars in bad condition (le
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cInssMate ate Fege Given 35 sellers. good cars 25 selless. )Bjuaa_iwallg to pay $1e,o gdcau and$300 ar aad ars Sellrs valus Ja themarket both the wnich are Cars aaad camdihm ha ue at ba comdihon the sellers knaa wil be so he Since anay their Condiho

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