consider the game on the right. Perform IDSDS on this game. Which strategies do you eliminate, and in which order?
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consider the game on the right. Perform IDSDS on this game.
Which strategies do you eliminate,...
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For...
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For each one, identify which strategies are non-rationalizable (if any), and which strategies are strictly dominated (if any). Do this for both players in each game. Note: You don't need to use IESDS or IENBR in this problem: I only want to know which strategies are strictly dominated or non-rationalizable in the games as presented. Rogers Go Rogue Go Legit 2,3 3,4 3,2 5,1 3,1...
Consider the following. (Assume that the dice are distinguishable and that what is observed are t...
Consider the following. (Assume that the dice are distinguishable and that what is observed are the numbers that face up.) HINT [See Examples 1-3.] Two distinguishable dice are rolled; the numbers add to 7. Describe the sample space S of the experiment. (Select all that apply.) (4,1) (4,2) (4,3) (4,4) (4,5) (4,6) (6,1) (6,2) (6,3) (6,4) (6,5) (6,6) (3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,5) (3,6) (3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,5) (3,6) (3,7) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3) (2,4) (2,5) (2,6) (2,7) (1,1) (1,2)...
QUESTION 3 Perform IDSDS on the game below: Player 2 3, 4 3, 2 4, 4...
QUESTION 3 Perform IDSDS on the game below: Player 2 3, 4 3, 2 4, 4 2,1 3, 3 0, 4 3, 0 5, 2 Player 1 3, 5 2, 3 Which strategy profile(s) survive(s) IDSDS? A. a,X C. a,z D.b,x E. b.y F. b,Z G. C,X H. C.y I. C.Z K. d.y L. d,z
help please and thanks Consider the game: A (2,3) (2,2) (8,6) B (4,0) () () 8,...
help please and thanks
Consider the game: A (2,3) (2,2) (8,6) B (4,0) () () 8, 6 5, 6 4, 3 1,6 1,8 8,9 3, 2 F(9,)(7,2) (5,3) 3. Cross out all dominated strategies for Player 1. 4. Use iterated dominance to find the Nash Equilibrium 5. Does the Nash equilibrium maximize social welfare? Why? Why not? NE=
IDSDS= Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies Exercise 3- Unemployment benefits. Consider the following simultaneous-move game...
IDSDS= Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Exercise 3- Unemployment benefits. Consider the following simultaneous-move game between the government (row player), which decides whether to offer unemployment benefits, and an unemployed worker (column player), who chooses whether to search for a job. As you interpret from the payoff matrix below, the unemployed worker only finds it optimal to search for a job when he receives no unemployment benefit; while the government only finds it optimal to help the worker when...
7. Consider the following two player game, with the players being 1 and 2. As usual...
7. Consider the following two player game, with the players being 1 and 2. As usual 1 chooses a row and 2 a column. ABC a 1,4 2,1 3,2 4,1 b 2,3 3,4 4,3 1,2 с 3,1 4,2 1,4 2,3 d 4,2 1,3 4,3 3,2 (a) Which strategies satisfy iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? How many levels of knowledge of rationality do you have to assume to obtain your result? (b) If you were allowed to follow the same...
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1...
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 Water 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 ROWENA Wind 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 Fire 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 124 [CH. 4] SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Does either Rowena or Colin have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. (b) Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. Give the order in which the eliminations occur and give the...
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies player 1 has is and player 2...
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2 moves
at information sets (Please write
numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
We were unable to transcribe this imagePlayer lI D E A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
Exercise 4 - Pure strategies that are only strictly dominated by a mixed strategy Consider the...
Exercise 4 - Pure strategies that are only strictly dominated by a mixed strategy Consider the following normal form game Player 2 Left Right Player 1 4,1 Down 13 12 b) Is there some strictly dominated strategy for player 1 when mixed strategies are allowed? [Hint: 0,2 4,1 Middle0,0 a) c) d) Is there some strictly dominated strategy for player 1 involving only the use of pure strategies? you may assign probabilities to two of her strategies, similarly as we...
Problem #3: Strictly dominated and non-rationalizable strategies (6 pts) Below, there are three game tables. For each one, identify which strategies are non-rationalizable (if any), and which strategies are strictly dominated (if any). Do this for both players in each game. Note: You don't need to use IESDS or IENBR in this problem: I only want to know which strategies are strictly dominated or non-rationalizable in the games as presented. Rogers Go Rogue Go Legit 2,3 3,4 3,2 5,1 3,1...
QUESTION 3 Perform IDSDS on the game below: Player 2 3, 4 3, 2 4, 4 2,1 3, 3 0, 4 3, 0 5, 2 Player 1 3, 5 2, 3 Which strategy profile(s) survive(s) IDSDS? A. a,X C. a,z D.b,x E. b.y F. b,Z G. C,X H. C.y I. C.Z K. d.y L. d,z
help please and thanks
Consider the game: A (2,3) (2,2) (8,6) B (4,0) () () 8, 6 5, 6 4, 3 1,6 1,8 8,9 3, 2 F(9,)(7,2) (5,3) 3. Cross out all dominated strategies for Player 1. 4. Use iterated dominance to find the Nash Equilibrium 5. Does the Nash equilibrium maximize social welfare? Why? Why not? NE=
IDSDS= Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Exercise 3- Unemployment benefits. Consider the following simultaneous-move game between the government (row player), which decides whether to offer unemployment benefits, and an unemployed worker (column player), who chooses whether to search for a job. As you interpret from the payoff matrix below, the unemployed worker only finds it optimal to search for a job when he receives no unemployment benefit; while the government only finds it optimal to help the worker when...
7. Consider the following two player game, with the players being 1 and 2. As usual 1 chooses a row and 2 a column. ABC a 1,4 2,1 3,2 4,1 b 2,3 3,4 4,3 1,2 с 3,1 4,2 1,4 2,3 d 4,2 1,3 4,3 3,2 (a) Which strategies satisfy iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? How many levels of knowledge of rationality do you have to assume to obtain your result? (b) If you were allowed to follow the same...
S5. Consider the following game table: COLIN North South East West Earth 1,3 3,1 0,2 1,1 Water 1,2 1,2 2,3 1,1 ROWENA Wind 3,2 2,1 1,3 0,3 Fire 2,0 3,0 1,1 2,2 124 [CH. 4] SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE GAMES: DISCRETE STRATEGIES (a) Does either Rowena or Colin have a dominant strategy? Explain why or why not. (b) Use iterated elimination of dominated strategies to reduce the game as much as possible. Give the order in which the eliminations occur and give the...
Consider the strategic form game above. The number of strategies
player 1 has is and player 2 moves
at information sets (Please write
numerical values like 0,1, 74, etc.).
We were unable to transcribe this imagePlayer lI D E A 2,6 0A 4A В 3,3 0,0 1,5 С 1,1 3,5 2,3 Player
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
Exercise 4 - Pure strategies that are only strictly dominated by a mixed strategy Consider the following normal form game Player 2 Left Right Player 1 4,1 Down 13 12 b) Is there some strictly dominated strategy for player 1 when mixed strategies are allowed? [Hint: 0,2 4,1 Middle0,0 a) c) d) Is there some strictly dominated strategy for player 1 involving only the use of pure strategies? you may assign probabilities to two of her strategies, similarly as we...
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