Homework Answers
For player 2, action x strictly dominates action z hence action z should be eliminated in the process of iteration. Now for player 1, action c dominates action d hence eliminate d.
Now none of the strategies can be eliminated and they survive iteration of strictly dominated strategies are (a,x) ,(a,y), (b,x),(b,y),(c,x),(c,y).
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QUESTION 3 Perform IDSDS on the game below: Player 2 3, 4 3, 2 4, 4...
Perform IDSDS on the game below Player 2 Player 1 0, 4 2, 2 0, 2...
Perform IDSDS on the game below Player 2 Player 1 0, 4 2, 2 0, 2 1, 2 3, 0 Which strategy profile(s) survive IDSDS? А.а.x C. a,z D.b.x E. b.y F. b,z G. C,X H. C.y L. C,Z
consider the game on the right. Perform IDSDS on this game. Which strategies do you eliminate,...
consider the game on the right. Perform IDSDS on this game.
Which strategies do you eliminate, and in which order?
1. Consider the Player 2 game on the right. Perform IDSDS orn this game. Which strategies do you eliminate a 1,20,5 2,2 4,0O b 1,35,2 5,3 2,0 c 2,3 4,0 3,3 6,2 d 3,4 2,1 4,0 7,5 Player 1 and in which order?
IDSDS= Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies Exercise 3- Unemployment benefits. Consider the following simultaneous-move game...
IDSDS= Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Exercise 3- Unemployment benefits. Consider the following simultaneous-move game between the government (row player), which decides whether to offer unemployment benefits, and an unemployed worker (column player), who chooses whether to search for a job. As you interpret from the payoff matrix below, the unemployed worker only finds it optimal to search for a job when he receives no unemployment benefit; while the government only finds it optimal to help the worker when...
We have answer of question 3. So please solve the question 4 and 5. I need...
We have answer of question 3. So please solve the
question 4 and 5. I need detailed information about them.
Could you please answer quickly.
Question 3 Find the strategy profiles that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Player 2 M R L 1,3 2,1 2,2 Player 1 D0,2 1,1 Question 4 Can we have a Nash equilibrium in the game in Question 3 where Player 2 chooses M? Explain. Question 5 Check each strategy profile of the...
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice....
Game: Extensive Form. Suppose player 1 chooses G or H, and player 2 observes this choice. If player 1 chooses H, then player 2 must choose A or B. Player 1 does not get to observe this choice by player 2, and must then choose X or Y. If A and X are played, the payoff for player 1 is 1 and for player 2 it's 5. If A and Y are played, the payoff for player 1 is 6...
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
1. In the game below A chooses rows and B (i) Find all the strategies that...
1. In the game below A chooses rows and B
(i) Find all the strategies that survive iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS)
(ii) Find each player’s best responses and the Nash
Equilibrium
2. Consider the game structure below for the next several
questions:
(i) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in
order for U to be a strictly dominated strategy?
(ii) What must be true about the values of a, b,...
2. (25 pts) Consider a two player game with a payoff matrix (1)/(2) L U D...
2. (25 pts) Consider a two player game with a payoff matrix (1)/(2) L U D R (2,1) (1,0) (0,0) (3,-4) where e E{-1,1} is a parameter known by player 2 only. Player 1 believes that 0 = 1 with probability 1/2 and 0 = -1 with probability 1/2. Everything above is common knowledge. (a) Write down the strategy space of each player. (b) Find the set of pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria.
WHICH equation describes the relationship between X and Y as in the table below x y 3 5 4 9 5 13 6 17 a
WHICH equation describes the relationship between X and Y as in the table below x y 3 5 4 9 5 13 6 17a. y=4x-7,b.y=x+12,c.y=2x-5,d.y=3x-5can you give me the answer and explane it for me please!!!!!!!!!!!!
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate-...
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
Perform IDSDS on the game below Player 2 Player 1 0, 4 2, 2 0, 2 1, 2 3, 0 Which strategy profile(s) survive IDSDS? А.а.x C. a,z D.b.x E. b.y F. b,z G. C,X H. C.y L. C,Z
consider the game on the right. Perform IDSDS on this game.
Which strategies do you eliminate, and in which order?
1. Consider the Player 2 game on the right. Perform IDSDS orn this game. Which strategies do you eliminate a 1,20,5 2,2 4,0O b 1,35,2 5,3 2,0 c 2,3 4,0 3,3 6,2 d 3,4 2,1 4,0 7,5 Player 1 and in which order?
IDSDS= Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Exercise 3- Unemployment benefits. Consider the following simultaneous-move game between the government (row player), which decides whether to offer unemployment benefits, and an unemployed worker (column player), who chooses whether to search for a job. As you interpret from the payoff matrix below, the unemployed worker only finds it optimal to search for a job when he receives no unemployment benefit; while the government only finds it optimal to help the worker when...
We have answer of question 3. So please solve the
question 4 and 5. I need detailed information about them.
Could you please answer quickly.
Question 3 Find the strategy profiles that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Player 2 M R L 1,3 2,1 2,2 Player 1 D0,2 1,1 Question 4 Can we have a Nash equilibrium in the game in Question 3 where Player 2 chooses M? Explain. Question 5 Check each strategy profile of the...
3. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, z. The game is presented in the following matrix: W Z X y a 3,3 2,1 0,2 2,1 b 1,1 1,2 1,0 1,4 0,0 1,0 3,2 1,1 d 0,0 0,5 0,2 3,1 с Find all the Nash equilibria in the game in pure strategies.
1. In the game below A chooses rows and B
(i) Find all the strategies that survive iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS)
(ii) Find each player’s best responses and the Nash
Equilibrium
2. Consider the game structure below for the next several
questions:
(i) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in
order for U to be a strictly dominated strategy?
(ii) What must be true about the values of a, b,...
2. (25 pts) Consider a two player game with a payoff matrix (1)/(2) L U D R (2,1) (1,0) (0,0) (3,-4) where e E{-1,1} is a parameter known by player 2 only. Player 1 believes that 0 = 1 with probability 1/2 and 0 = -1 with probability 1/2. Everything above is common knowledge. (a) Write down the strategy space of each player. (b) Find the set of pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria.
1. Consider the following game in normal form. Player 1 is the "row" player with strate- gies a, b, c, d and Player 2 is the "column" player with strategies w, x, y, 2. The game is presented in the following matrix: a b c d w 3,3 1,1 0,0 0,0 x 2,1 1,2 1,0 0,5 y 0,2 1,0 3, 2 0,2 z 2,1 1,4 1,1 3,1 (a) Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Find the set of Nash...
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