Question

1. In the game below A chooses rows and B

(i) Find all the strategies that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS)

(ii) Find each player’s best responses and the Nash Equilibrium

2. Consider the game structure below for the next several questions:

(i) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in order for U to be a strictly dominated strategy?

(ii) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in order for L to be a strictly dominated strategy?

Professor Raymond Problem Set 6 . In the game below A chooses rows and B chooses columns: M4.4 153 99 B 7,3 6,0 3.1 sies (IDSDS) ()Find each player's best responses and the Nash Equilibrium 2. Consider the game structure below for the next several questions: LR D (eb) The row player is A, the column player is B. Parameters a, b, c, and d are payoffs. i) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in order for U to bea strictly dominated strategy? i) What must be true about the values of a, b, c, and d in order for L to be a strictly dominated strategy?

Answer 1

1) In first round,T and B will be eliminated by first player because M is a dominant strategy

Player 2 will eliminate C.

B)nest response, player 1 plays M irrespective of player 2. Players 2 best strategy is to play R given player 1 plays M.

(M, R) will be Nash equilibrium

2)a) for U to be dominated strategy, c>a and d>b

B)L to be dominated strategy, c>a and d>b.