Ans) nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect having a payoff ( 1,1)
Apart from this outcome, no player can be made better off without making other worse off
What is (are) the Nash equilibrium (equilibria) in the game shown below? Player 2 Cooperate Defect...
Find all the Nash equilibria in the following game and indicate which are strict. Player 2 d b a -1,4 1,-3 2,7 W 2,7 Player 1 2.1 0,4 1, 3 1, 2 Y -1,6 6,2 3.2 1,1 Z 7,1 5.2 0.2 3,1 O (Wa) and (W,c). Neither are strict. O (W,c) and (Z,b). Both are strict O (Wc) and (Z,b). Neither are strict. O There are no Nash equilibria in this game.
7. Consider the simultaneous hawk-dove game belon. What are the Nash Equilibria of the game? (5pts) Pizver 2 Hawk Dove Hawk -10-10 DO Player 1 Dove 0.10 3.3
Find the interest rate range for which the Nash Equilibrium of this infinitely-repeating game would be (Cooperate, Cooperate). Payoff to player A is to the left, payoff to player B is to the right. PLAYER B PLAYER A Cheat Cooperate Cheat (0, 0) (200, -100) Cooperate (-100, 200) (180, 180)
Compute the Nash equilibria of the following location game. There are two people who simultaneously select numbers between zero and one. Suppose player 1 chooses s1 and player 2 chooses s2 . If si < sj , then player i gets a payoff of (si + sj )>2 and player j obtains 1 − (si + sj )>2, for i = 1, 2. If s1 = s2 , then both players get a payoff of 1>2. Please make sure to...
QUESTION 15 Consider the following simultaneous-move game: Two firms, Firm 1 (raw player) and Firm 2 (column player), decide whether to enter (E) or not enter (N) some market. If neither enters, then both make 0. If both enter, the market is oversaturated and so both earn a loss of 5. However, if only one enters, then the entrant earns monopoly profit of 10. Which of the following matrices is the correct representation of the static game? 0.10 10.0 0.0...
Questions 7-10 For each of the following games, please identify the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. (There may be none, or multiple). Note: assume the payoffs in the boxes are "positive" -- i.e. higher numbers represent better payoffs. Player 1 Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #2 Strategy A 20 B 100 #1 20 No a Strategy No 5 100 Player 2 Strategy Strategy Player 1 Strategy #1 Strategy Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #2 15 R 50 70 20 x 20...
Questions 7-10 For each of the following games, please identify the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. (There may be none, or multiple). Note: assume the payoffs in the boxes are "positive"- i.e. higher numbers represent better payoffs. Player 2 Strategy Strategy #2 ii Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #1 # 2 R 50 20 Strategy 15 20 100 Strategy 70 20 #1 #1 10 10 20 5 Strategy Strategy 70 Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 60 100 #2 15 Player 2...
3. Player 1 and Player 2 are going to play the following stage game twice: Player 2 Left Middle Right Player 1 Top 4, 3 0, 0 1, 4 Bottom 0, 0 2, 1 0, 0 There is no discounting in this problem and so a player’s payoff in this repeated game is the sum of her payoffs in the two plays of the stage game. (a) Find the Nash equilibria of the stage game. Is (Top, Left) a...
2. Find all Nash equilibria (including MSNE) in the following game. Player 2 M Actions L R Player 1,3 2,-2 3,1 1,4 5,0 (Hint: first, show that some action is strictly dominated. Then, find all MSNE in the reduced game).
What is the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game below? Amaya Left Right Bilal Bilal Up Down Up Down (20, 10) (-5, 20) (-5,5) (0,0)