Questions 7-10 For each of the following games, please identify the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. (There...
Questions 7-10 For each of the following games, please identify the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. (There may be none, or multiple). Note: assume the payoffs in the boxes are "positive" -- i.e. higher numbers represent better payoffs. Player 1 Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #2 Strategy A 20 B 100 #1 20 No a Strategy No 5 100 Player 2 Strategy Strategy Player 1 Strategy #1 Strategy Player 2 Strategy Strategy #1 #2 15 R 50 70 20 x 20...
Determine ALL of the Nash equilibria (pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria) of the following 3 games: Player 1 H T Player 2 HT (1, -1) (-1,1) | (-1,1) (1, -1) | Н Player 1 H D Player 2 D (2, 2) (3,1) | (3,1) |(2,2) | Player 2 A (2, 2) (0,0) Player 1 A B B (0,0) | (3,4)
Q. 1. Consider the following pay off matrix of the two players: A and B. What are the Nash equilibria in the game? [3 Marks] Player 2 Player 1 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D 4.2 11,2 12. 14 Strategy E 13.6 0,0 4. 11 Strategy F 1.3 15, 10 5.4
Froblem #5: Convert extensive-form to strategic-form, find Nash equilibria and subgame. perfect Nash equilibria (12pts) Consider the following extensive-form game: Veto Y Don't Veto In this game, Players 1 and 2 are deciding on a course of action, which may be X, Y, or Z Player 2 is the one who actually makes the choice, but first Player may choose to veto Y, which is the option Player 1 prefers the least. a) List all the strategies available to Player...
a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria. b.) *Find all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. c.) Explain why, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium, each player must be indifferent between the pure strategies that she randomizes over. Consider the following game: - 2 LR 2
Consider the following game: a) Identify all Nash Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous game. b) Identify a trigger strategy for each player that sustains (B,B) as an equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game. For what interest(discount) rates will this outcome be sustainable? Firm 2 А B A -5,-5 195,-50 Firm 1 -50,215 45,75
6. Consider the following game: a. Identify all Nash Equilibria (Pure Strategy and Mixed) of this simultaneous game. b. Draw the two extensive form games that arise from each firm moving first. What are the Subgame Perfect Equilibria of these games? c. Identify a trigger strategy for each player that sustains (B,B) as an equilibrium. For what interest (discount) rates will this outcome be sustainable?
GAME MATRIX Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Consider two players (Rose as player...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
(2,5). Find the Walrasian equilibrium. 4. 120] Answer the following. (a) 14 Explain the difference between a strategy that is a best response versus a strategy that is strictly dominant. (b) (6) Consider the following game: player 2 D E F C A 3,7 7,3 1,2 4,3 player 1 B 8,9 8,5 2,8 5,2 C 0,10 7,01,9 2,2 Find the strictly dominant strategies solution and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution, if any. (c) [10] Consider the following...