Homework Answers
Answer:-
Because products are perfect substitutes the price charged by the two firms will be the lowest possible price.
Hence here P1 = P2 = marginal cost = $50.
So, In Bertrand equilibrium, firm 1's price is $50 and firm 2's price is $50.
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Suppose identical price setting duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $50 per unit and no...
Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $16 per unit. Firm 1 faces...
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Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p 270-Q Each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit What is the Coumot equilibrium? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q1) and Firm 2 (42) are -85 units 02- 85units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) 10 and PM The Cournot equilbrium price is he Counot equilibrium? mot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (91) and Firm 2 (42) are 1 85 units 2 85...
Two firms sell identical products and compete as Cournot (price-setting) competitors in a market with a...
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Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $16 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of q1 130-2p1+1p2 where q1 is Firm 1's output, p1 is Firm 1's price, and p2 is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is 2 130-2P2+ 1p1 Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium. Note that OTI _-130-2p1 + 1p2-2p1 +32-0 op1 and oP2 p 130-2p2+ 1p1-2p2+320 In equilibrium, p1 equals $and p2 eqs (Enter numeric responses using integers.)
15.2 where a, b > 0 a. Suppose that firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market demand is given by P = a - bQ. Calculate the profit-maximizing price-quantity combination for a monopolist. Also calculate the monopolist's profit. b. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities for Cournot duopolists, which choose quantities for their identical products simultaneously. Also compute market output, market price, and firm and industry profits. c. Calculate the Nash equilibrium prices...
Duopoly, quantity-setting firms face the market demand p = 270 - Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $30 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (91) and Firm 2 (92) are 91 = units and 92 = units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)
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