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Quiz: Chapter 13 Quiz This Question Reken Bebe 6of74 complete There are two firms Firm 1 is the humbent, which is current pro

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The to Monopolist would $1781.25 to up. pay a fee of deter entry. We have Explanation Cormot Solution P= 130 - G front (RoofiNow we compose, Cormor proht $695 with monopalet pretita Misnefody Solution MR = MC 130 - 2Q = 55 i Q = 375 . and P = 9.5 T=

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