Question

6. A decision maker has a vNM utility function over money of u(x) = x2. This...

6. A decision maker has a vNM utility function over money of u(x) = x2. This decision maker is (a) risk-averse. (b) risk-neutral. (c) risk-loving. (d) none of the above.

7. Consider two lotteries: • Lottery 1: The gamble (0.1, 0.6, 0.3) over the final wealth levels ($1, $2, $3). (The expected value of this lottery equals $2.2) • Lottery 2: Get $2.2 for sure. a) Any risk-averse individual will choose the first lottery. b) Any risk-averse individual will choose the second lottery. c) Any risk-averse individual will be indifferent between these two lotteries. d) None of the above

0 0
Add a comment Improve this question Transcribed image text
Answer #1

U(X) = x2. For different devels of x we have uxlas marginal u tiut foom wealth X=100 u(x1= 200 2001 Constant 200 X=200 x=300Since, Expected and sure returns are equal So Risk Averse decision maker will (b) Choose Lottery-2 why? Because he want to mi

Add a comment
Know the answer?
Add Answer to:
6. A decision maker has a vNM utility function over money of u(x) = x2. This...
Your Answer:

Post as a guest

Your Name:

What's your source?

Earn Coins

Coins can be redeemed for fabulous gifts.

Not the answer you're looking for? Ask your own homework help question. Our experts will answer your question WITHIN MINUTES for Free.
Similar Homework Help Questions
  • 2. An individual has a vNM utility function over money of u(x) -Vx, where x is final wealth. Assu...

    2. An individual has a vNM utility function over money of u(x) -Vx, where x is final wealth. Assume the individual currently has $16. He is offered a lottery with three possible outcomes; he could gain an extra S9, lose $7, or not lose or gain anything. There is a 15% probability that he will win the extra $9, what minimum probability, p, of losing S7 would ensure that the individual chooses to not play the lottery? (a) p >...

  • Suppose the utility function of a decision maker for the amount of money x is given...

    Suppose the utility function of a decision maker for the amount of money x is given by U(x) = x2. (a) This decision maker is considering the following two lotteries: A: With probability 1, he gains 3000. B: With probability 0.4, he gains TL 1000, and with probability 0.6, he gains TL 4000. Which of the two lotteries will the decision maker prefer? What is the certainty equivalent (CE) for lottery B? Based on the CE for B, is the...

  • Question 8: Consider a decision-maker with utility function u(x) = x^0.8 , where x>0 denotes the...

    Question 8: Consider a decision-maker with utility function u(x) = x^0.8 , where x>0 denotes the decision-maker’s wealth. a. Determine the decision-maker’s attitude towards risk. In other words, is this decision-maker risk-neutral, risk-averse or risk-loving? Provide a justification of your answer. Solution: We have ?''(x) = -0.16x^-1.2 <0 . Hence, the decision-maker is risk-averse. Please explain solution. How did he get the answer?

  • (1) Ann has vNM utility u1 (x) = x, Bob has utility u2 (x) = √...

    (1) Ann has vNM utility u1 (x) = x, Bob has utility u2 (x) = √ x and Carl has utility u3 (x) = x 3 . Who is risk neutral, risk averse and risk loving? (2) Consider the lottery P again. Find the dollar amount x such that each person is indifferent between the lottery P and $x (x is the certainty equivalent of P) (3) Calculate the Arrow-Pratt coefficients for everyone. How do they compare? Does this agree...

  • 4. An individual has a VNM utility function over money of u(x)=x", where x is the...

    4. An individual has a VNM utility function over money of u(x)=x", where x is the amount of money won in the lottery. She faces two scenarios: • Scenario 1: With a 50% probability she wins $36. With a 50% probability she wins $16. • Scenario 2: With a 50% probability she wins $0. With a 50% probability she wins $x. For what value of x will the risk premia be identical in these two scenarios? a. O b. 4...

  • 6. Consider an individual whose utility function over money is u(w)= 1+2w2. (a) Is the individual...

    6. Consider an individual whose utility function over money is u(w)= 1+2w2. (a) Is the individual risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-loving? Does it depend on w? (b) Suppose the individual has initial wealth ¥W and faces the possible loss of Y". The probability that the loss will occur is . Suppose insurance is available at price p, where p is not necessarily the fair price. Find the optimal amount of insurance the individual should buy. You may assume that the solution...

  • 8. An individual with utility function over money u(w) = 8Vw has $C in cash and...

    8. An individual with utility function over money u(w) = 8Vw has $C in cash and a lottery ticket that pays $W if it wins and nothing if it loses. The probability of winning is .. Suppose an insurance is available at price $p per unit, where each unit of insurance pays $1 if the ticket does not win and nothing if it wins. (a) Is the individual risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving? (b) What is the fair...

  • 8) Kurt is an expected utility maximizer with a Bernoulli utility u(w) = w1/2 facing the...

    8) Kurt is an expected utility maximizer with a Bernoulli utility u(w) = w1/2 facing the choice between two gambles. Gamble 1 would give him $100 with probability 0.7, $50 with probability 0.1 and $150 otherwise. Gamble 2 would give $200 with probability 0.6, $100 with probability 0.2 and $0 otherwise. Which of the following is true. a. Kurt is indifferent between the two gambles. b. the two gambles yield the same expected wealth. Kurt prefers Gamble 1 over Gamble...

  • . Julia and John prefer more money to less and have transitive prefernces. Each of them...

    . Julia and John prefer more money to less and have transitive prefernces. Each of them faces the following decision problem. S260 $80 M T SX 30% 50% 20% S320 $80 $0 $320 S0 (a) Suppose that Julia is risk neutral. If she chooses A and then U, what can we deduce about the possible values of X and p? (b) Continue to assume that Julia is risk neutral. Suppose that X-250, p 0.9. Julia is given a choice between...

  • intermediate micro 4. Steve's utility function over leisure and consumption is given by NLY) - min...

    intermediate micro 4. Steve's utility function over leisure and consumption is given by NLY) - min (31.7. Wage rate is w and the price of the composite consumption good is p=1. (a) Suppose w = 5. Find the optimal leisure consumption combination. What is the amount of hours worked? (b) Suppose the overtime law is passed so that every worker needs to be paid 1.5 times their current wage for hours worked beyond the first 8 hours, Will this law...

ADVERTISEMENT
Free Homework Help App
Download From Google Play
Scan Your Homework
to Get Instant Free Answers
Need Online Homework Help?
Ask a Question
Get Answers For Free
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT