(a)
P = 400 - 2Q1 - 2Q2
For firm 1,
TR1 = P x Q1 = 400Q1 - 2Q12 - 2Q1Q2
C1 = Q12
Profit (Z1) = TR1 - C1 = 400Q1 - 2Q12 - 2Q1Q2 - Q12 = 400Q1 - 3Q12 - 2Q1Q2
For Firm 2,
TR2 = P x Q2 = 400Q2 - 2Q1Q2 - 2Q22
C2 = Q12
Profit (Z2) = TR2 - C2 = 400Q2 - 2Q1Q2 - 2Q22 - Q12
(II)
For firm 1, profit is maximized when Z1/Q1 = 0.
Z1/Q1 = 400 - 6Q1 - 2Q2 = 0
6Q1 + 2Q2 = 400.........(1) [best response, firm 1]
For firm 2, profit is maximized when Z2/Q2 = 0.
Z2/Q2 = 400 - 2Q1 - 4Q2 = 0
2Q1 + 4Q2 = 400.........(2) [best response, firm 2]
Cournot equilibrium is obtained by solving (1) and (2). Multiplying (2) by 3,
6Q1 + 12Q2 = 1200........(3)
6Q1 + 2Q2 = 400.........(1)
(3) - (1) gives us:
10Q2 = 800
Q2 = 80
Q1 = (400 - 4Q2)/2 [from (2)] = [400 - (4 x 80)]/2 = (400 - 320)/2 = 80/2 = 40
(c)
Q = 40 + 80 = 120
P = 400 - 2 x (Q1 + Q2) = 400 - 2Q = 400 - (2 x 120) = 400 - 240 = 160
Profit, Firm 1 = (400 x 40) - (3 x 40 x 40) - (2 x 40 x 80) = 16,000 - 4,800 - 6,400 = 4,800
Profit, Firm 2 = (400 x 80) - (2 x 40 x 80) - (2 x 80 x 80) - (40 x 40) = 32,000 - 6,400 - 12,800 - 1,600 = 11,200
NOTE: You can just check once if C2(Q2) = (Q1)2, since in general, cost function of one firm does not depend on output of another firm. I've solved this only on basis of information given by you.
3. Two firms in the market, 1 and 2, face an inverse demand function given by...
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