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There are 2 firms in a market producing differentiated products. The firms both have MC that...
Suppose there are two firms in a market producing differentiated products. Both firms have MC=0. The demand for firm 1 and 2’s products are given by: q1(p1,p2) = 5 - 2p1 + p2 q2(p1,p2) = 5 - 2p2 + p1 a. First, suppose that the two firms compete in prices (i.e. Bertrand). Compute and graph each firm’s best response functions. What is the sign of the slope of the firms’ best-response functions? Are prices strategic substitutes or complements? b. Solve...
Two firms produce closely-related products and have marginal costs MC1=10 and MC2=20. The market supplied by firm 1 has demand Q1=100-2p1+p2, while 2's market has demand Q2=100+p1-2p2. The two firms are engaged in Bertrand price competition. Two firms produce closely-related products, and have marginal costs MC1-10 and MC2-20. The market supplied by firm 1 has demand Q1 = 100-2p1+P2, while 2's market has demand Q2=100+p1- 2p2. The two firms are engaged in Bertrand price competition. 3(a)What is the intercept of...
Mathematical Question 3 (30pts) 3. Consider two firms are performing Cournot price competition in two differentiated goods markets. Firm 1 produces goods 1, and firm 2 produces goods 2, and two market demand functions are given by 91 (P1,P2) = 12-2p1 + P2 and 921,P2) = 12-2p2 + P 1. Furthermore, assume that the two firms have the same cost function such that fixed cost is $20 and variable cost is zero. a. (10pts) Calculate the equilibrium prices, quantities and...
(2) Differentiated goods Rather than identical goods, now the two firms are producing differentiated goods, with each behaves as the competitor to the other. Specifically, two goods have following market demand functions: qı = D1(P1, P2) = 110 – P1 + 2p2 92 = D2 (P1, P2) = 55 – 2p2 + P1 Also, two firms have following marginal costs: MC1 = 10, MC2 = 5 Please calculate what is the equilibrium price and quantity for each firm.
Two firms produce differentiated products with demand curves p1 = a – q1 – bq2 and p2 = a – q2 – bq1. They both face constant average and marginal cost c and their profit functions are profit = (p1 – c)q1 and profit = (p2 — c)q2, respectively. Solve the Bertrand game. Hint: You need to solve the system of equations p1 = a − q1 − bq2 and p2 = a − q2 − bq1 for q1 and...
3. Two firms in the market, 1 and 2, face an inverse demand function given by P(Q1 +Q2) = 400 – 2Q1 – 202 where Q1 is the level of production of firm 1 and Q2 is the level of production of firm 2. The cost function of firm 1 is C1 (Q1) = (Q1) and the cost function of firm 2 is C2 (Q2) = (Q1). The two firms compete in quantities (i.e., Cournot competition). (a) Set up the...
Answer the following question. Please show all your working/explanation. Three firms compete a la Cournot (compete in a Cournot Competition). Each firm has constant marginal cost c. Inverse demand curve is 1 - Q, where Q is the total quantity. Firm 1 moves first, and chooses q1 . After firm 1 chooses q1, firms 2 and 3 move second and simultaneously choose q2 and q3 . Find the equilibrium quantities q1, q2, q3 .
4. Consider about a duopoly case: two firms compete by choosing prices for two differentiated goods. Their demand functions are Q1 = 20-P1+ P2 and Q2-20 + P1-P2, where Pi and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Qi and Q2 are the resulting demands. Fixed costs and marginal costs are both zero. (a) Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Na equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how...
Two firms produce closely-related products, and have marginal costs MC1=10 and MC2=20. The market supplied by firm 1 has demand Q1=100-2p1+p2, while 2's market has demand Q2=100+p1-2p2. The two firms are engaged in Bertrand price competition. 3(a)What is the intercept of firm 1's price reaction curve? (One digit after the decimal point only) 3(b) What is the slope of firm 1's price reaction curve? (One digit after the decimal point only) 3(c) What is the intercept of firm 2's price...
2 Two firms compete in a market by selling differentiated products. The demand equations are given by the following equations: P2 91 = 75 - Pi + P1 92 = 75 - P2 + 2 assume that each firm has a marginal cost (and average costs) of o. a. What market model do we use if each firm competes by simultaneously choosing price? b. Are the two goods substitutes? C. Solve for firm 1's best response function. d. Solve for...