2 Two firms compete in a market by selling differentiated products. The demand equations are given...
91 = Two firms compete in a market by selling differentiated products. The demand equations are given by the following equations: P2 75 – P1 + 75 – P2 + 2. assume that each firm has a marginal cost (and average costs) of 0. a. What market model do we use if each firm competes by simultaneously choosing price? P 92 = b. Are the two goods substitutes? C. Solve for firm 1's best response function. d. Solve for the...
7. Two firms compete in a market by selling differentiated products. The demand equations are given by the following equations: P2 qı = 75 – Pi + 2 P1 92 = 75 – P2 + 2 assume that each firm has a marginal cost (and average costs) of O. a. Solve for firm l's best response function. b. Solve for the equilibrium price and quantity. C. Would firm 1 still be able to compete in the market if their marginal...
Suppose there are two firms in a market producing differentiated products. Both firms have MC=0. The demand for firm 1 and 2’s products are given by: q1(p1,p2) = 5 - 2p1 + p2 q2(p1,p2) = 5 - 2p2 + p1 a. First, suppose that the two firms compete in prices (i.e. Bertrand). Compute and graph each firm’s best response functions. What is the sign of the slope of the firms’ best-response functions? Are prices strategic substitutes or complements? b. Solve...
There are 2 firms in a market producing differentiated products. The firms both have MC that is equal to 0 Firm 1 demand is q1(p1,p2) = 6-2p1 + p2 Firm 2 demand is q2(p1,p2) = 6-2p2 + p1 1. Firms compete in quantities- Cournot Competition. What are the inverse demand functions for firm 1 and 2? 2. Find and graph each firm’s best response functions. The quantities are strategic substitutes or complements? 3. Find the Nash equilibrium prices and quantities...
4. Consider about a duopoly case: two firms compete by choosing prices for two differentiated goods. Their demand functions are Q1 = 20-P1+ P2 and Q2-20 + P1-P2, where Pi and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Qi and Q2 are the resulting demands. Fixed costs and marginal costs are both zero. (a) Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Na equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how...
(2) Differentiated goods Rather than identical goods, now the two firms are producing differentiated goods, with each behaves as the competitor to the other. Specifically, two goods have following market demand functions: qı = D1(P1, P2) = 110 – P1 + 2p2 92 = D2 (P1, P2) = 55 – 2p2 + P1 Also, two firms have following marginal costs: MC1 = 10, MC2 = 5 Please calculate what is the equilibrium price and quantity for each firm.
Microeconomics 4. Consider about a duopoly case: two firms compete by choosing prices for two differentiated goods. Their demand functions are Q1 20-P1 + P2 and Q2 20 +P1-P2, where Pi and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Qi and Q2 are the resulting demands. Fixed costs and marginal costs are both zero. (o) Suppose the two frms set their prices at the same time. Find the resalting Na equilibrium. What price will each firm charge,...
Two firms compete in a market with demand given by D(p) = 100 − p, where p is denoted in cents (p=100 is 1 dollar). Firms can only charge prices in whole cents – i.e. p can only take integer values, and not values like 1.5. Marginal costs for each firm are given by MC=10. Firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices. When prices are equal, each firm gets one half of total demand. b. Find all the Nash equilibria of...
Exercise 5: Two firms compete in a centralized market by choosing quantity produced (91,92) simultaneously. Aggregate production determines price, according to the following inverse demand function: p = [85 - 2 (91 +92)]. Firm l's total costs of production) are TC = 541. Firm 2's total costs are TC2 = 1592 a. Graph the combination of quantities (91,92) that yield the following profits: 11 (91.42) = T12 (91,92) = 450 ; 11 (41,42) = 500 ; 200; 12 (91,92) =...
Choose a,b,c,d 4. Consider about a duopoly case: two firms compete by choosing prices for two differentiated goods. Their demand functions are Q1 20-P1 + P2 and Q2 20 +P1-P2, where Pi and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Qi and Q2 are the resulting demands. Fixed costs and marginal costs are both zero. (o) Suppose the two frms set their prices at the same time. Find the resalting Na equilibrium. What price will each firm...