Answer:
Demand Function P=25-0.0005Q
Q=50000-2000P
Where Q=Qe+Qw
TC for east company
TCe= 4Q+0.001Qe^2
TC for west company
TCw= 10Q+0.001Qw^2
Part A)
For cartel Total profit
Profit B=TR-TCe-TCw=Q*P-(4Q+0.001Qe^2)-(10Q+0.001Qw^2)
B=Q*(25-0.0005Q)-(4Q+0.001Qe^2)-(10Q+0.001Qw^2)
B=(Qe+Qw)*(25-0.0005(Qe+Qw))-(4*(Qe+Qw)+0.001Qe^2)-(10*(Qe+Qw)+0.001Qw^2)
for profit maximization partial derivative of profit with respect to Qe should be zero.
dB/dQe=(25-0.0005(Qe+Qw))-0.0005*(Qe+Qw)-(4+0.002Qe)-(10)=0
0.003Qe+0.001Qw=11 Eq 1
for profit maximization partial derivative of profit with respect to Qw should be zero.
dB/dQw=(25-0.0005(Qe+Qw))-0.0005*(Qe+Qw)-(10+0.002Qw)-(4)=0
0.003Qw+0.001Qe=11 Eq 2
So from equation 1 and 2 we get
Qe=2750 units
Qw=2750 units
Q=Qe+Qw=2750+2750=5500 units
Part B)
Profit Maximizing price
P=25-0.0005Q=25-0.0005*5500=$22.25
Part C)
Profit for east Be=TRe-TCe=Qe*P-(4Q+0.001Qe^2)
Be=2750*22.25-(4*5500+0.001*2750^2)=$31,625
Profit for west Bw=TRw-TCw=Qw*P-(10Q+0.001Qw^2)
Be=2750*22.25-(10*5500+0.001*2750^2)=-$1,375
Total profit B=TR-TCe-TCw=Q*P-(4Q+0.001Qe^2)-(10Q+0.001Qw^2)
B=5500*22.25-(4*5500+0.001*2750^2)-(10*5500+0.001*2750^2)=$30,250
3. The East Company and the West Company are the only two firms that produce and...
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