Answer:
Inverse demand function P= 100- 2 Q and four firms
constant marginal cost of MC = 20.
the firms form a profit maximizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same output level.
The inverse demand function of the market is given as P = 100 - 2Q and it is also given that there are four firms in total facing same constant marginal cost (mc) of $20.
now , if they decide to form a cartel then they would collectively produce the quantity at which the combined (or) market's MR equals the MC , where MR is the first differentiation of the TR . Mathematically ,
MR = 100 - 4 Q, and the equilibrium condition is :
100-4 Q = 20
Q = 20
Now , since it is given hat all firms produce the same amount hence a single firm produces a quantity of 5 units (i.e )
Note: MR is obtained by first differentiation of TR with respect to q , as shown below :
TR = p* q
= q* (m -aq)
= m * q -a*q*q
MR =
= m - 2aq.
41.4 A market has an inverse demand func- tion p = 100 – 2Q and four...
Suppose that the (inverse) market demand function for wax paper is P=400-2Q where Q is total industry output. There are only two firms, Firm1 and Firm 2, that produce wax paper. Thus, Q=q1+q2. Each firm has no fixed cost but a constant marginal cost of production equals $40. (a) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the output quantity for Firm 1 (b) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the profit...
pls answer as many qwuestions!! 1. A market has an inverse demand curve and four firms, each of which has a constant marginal cost of. If the firms form a profit-maximizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same output level, how much does each firm produce? 2. Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand curve. Each firm has a marginal cost of $60 per unit. a. What is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium?...
3. Two firms that are engaged in Stackelberg competition face the market inverse demand curve P-100-2Q, where Q is the total 22-0.Sqy, what is Firm 1's (the first-mover's) nverse demand une output, q2. Each firm produces the product at a constant marginal cost of $22. If Firm 2's reaction function is P 56-4 OP=100-2(92-22 + 0.050;) OP=88-1.541 P 88-24
Consider a market with demand function D(p)=10-p and firms with constant marginal cost MC=1. Assume that there is no fixed cost and thus C(q1)=q1and C(q2)=q2 2. Suppose the owners of the two firms meet together secretly and agree to form a cartel. They choose a total level of production that maximizes their joint profits. They agree to split production and thus profits) equally (a) Suppose that both firms abide by their secret agreement. How much will each firm produce? What...
The demand function for an oligopolistic market is given by the equation, Q = 275 – 4P, where Q is quantity demanded and P is price (Note: inverse demand for the dominant firm here is P = 50 - .2Q). The industry has one dominant firm whose marginal cost function is: MC = 12 + 0.7QD, and many small firms, with a total supply function: QS = 25 + P. In equilibrium, the total output of all small firms is
. Consider a market with four firms in a cartel agreement which explicitly colludes to set a price by collectively restricting market output. The inverse market demand is P-1000-5 Q, and each firm has total costs of C(Q)-7000 +40 Q. (27 points) a) Determine the equilibrium price and quantity in the market. b) Calculate the output each individual firm will produce. c) Calculate the profits each firm will earn. Suppose one firm decides to unilaterally increase output by ten while...
A monopolist faces the inverse demand function described by p = 100-2q, where q is output. The monopolist has no fixed cost and his marginal cost is $20 at all levels of output. What is the monopolist's profit as a function of his output?
Industry demand is given by : P = 100-2Q The total cost for the individual firm of which there are 4, is given by: TCi = 10qi + qi2 If the 4 firms form a cartel what will be the price and output if the cartel is centralized and the cartel is decentralized
Suppose that a monopoly faces inverse market demand function as P = 70−2Q, and its marginal cost function is MC = 40 – Q. Please answer the following two questions: a. What should be the monopoly’s profit-maximizing output? b. What is the monopoly’s price?
Suppose the inverse demand curve for a commodity in a perfectly competitive market takes the functional form: P (Q) = -.1Q + 10. Additionally, the firm’s marginal cost (MC) takes the following functional form: MC = 4 + 2Q. Recalling that a perfectly competitive firm is a price-taker in the market and its profit-maximizing output level (Qe) is always found by equating its price with its marginal cost: P = MC. Given all this, how much output (Qe) should the...