Industry demand is given by :
P = 100-2Q
The total cost for the individual firm of which there are 4, is given by:
TCi = 10qi + qi2
If the 4 firms form a cartel what will be the price and output if
Industry demand is given by : P = 100-2Q The total cost for the individual firm of which there ar...
Industry demand is given by: P=150 – 3Q Cost curve for individual firm is given by: TC=5qi+2qi2 Assume there are 2 firms in the industry A and B. Costs are the same for both firms. Find price, output and profit given that it is a centralized cartel. Find prices and output for an individual firm and profit given that it is a decentralized cartel.
16. An industry has two firms. The cost function of Firm 1 is ci(q) 2q + 500, and the cost function of Firm 2 is cz(g) - 2q + 400. The demand function for the output of this industry is a downward-sloping straight line. In a Cournot equilibrium in which both firms produce positive amounts of output: a. Total output of both firms is less than the cartel (joint-profit maximizing) output b. Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce the same...
Consider a perfectly competitive industry in which each firm i has a total cost function given by the equation: TC= 128 + 4q+2q^2. Further assume that the industry demand function is given by the following: P = 84 – 2Q. a) Describe the long run market equilibrium. That is, identify the equilibrium price and quantity, output for each firm, the number of firms in the industry and the level of producer and consumer surplus. What is the value of own...
Suppose that the (inverse) market demand function for wax paper is P=400-2Q where Q is total industry output. There are only two firms, Firm1 and Firm 2, that produce wax paper. Thus, Q=q1+q2. Each firm has no fixed cost but a constant marginal cost of production equals $40. (a) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the output quantity for Firm 1 (b) Suppose that the two firms decide to form a cartel. Calculate the profit...
41.4 A market has an inverse demand func- tion p = 100 – 2Q and four firms, each of which has a constant marginal cost of MC = 20. If the firms form a profit-maxi- mizing cartel and agree to operate subject to the constraint that each firm will produce the same output level, how much does each firm produce?
At&t is the dominant firm in the local telecommunication industry, which has a total market demand given by Q = 100 - 2P. AT&T has competition from a fringe of four small firms that produce where their individual marginal costs equal the market price. The fringe firms each have total costs given by TCi = 10 Qi + Qi^2. If AT&T's total costs are given by TCa = 10 + 10 Qa, how much does the industry as a whole...
The demand function for an oligopolistic market is given by the equation, Q = 275 – 4P, where Q is quantity demanded and P is price (Note: inverse demand for the dominant firm here is P = 50 - .2Q). The industry has one dominant firm whose marginal cost function is: MC = 12 + 0.7QD, and many small firms, with a total supply function: QS = 25 + P. In equilibrium, the total output of all small firms is
a duopoly market in which the demand is = p = 120 - 2Q. The total cost for firm 1 is TC1=20q1, the total cost for firm 2 is TC1=40q2. The good is homogeneous. The two firms collude. What is the equilibrium price?
Please be descriptive. The inverse market demand curve for bean sprouts is given by P(Q) 100 2Q, and the marginal cost for any firm in the industry is $4. (a) (10 points) If the bean-sprout industry were perfectly competitive, what would be the industry output and the industry price? be the industry output would and the market price? as a follower. What would be the industry output would and the market price? (b) (20 points) If the firms were operating...
A duopoly market in which demand is given by 180-2q. The total cost for firm 1 is TC = 60q1, the total cost for firm 2 is TC1 = 66q2. The good is homogeneous. A) Solve for when Firm 1 chooses the quantity before firm 2. What is the subgame Nash equilibrium? b) Solve when the firms compete simultaneously. What is the Nash equilibrium?