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You are the manager of DELL. Assume that DELL manufactures computers at two locations. The inverse...

You are the manager of DELL. Assume that DELL manufactures computers at two locations. The inverse demand function for DELL computers is P = 500 – 2Q. The cost of producing computers at plant 1 is C1(Q1) = 100 + 2Q12LEazhIvMLAAAAAElFTkSuQmCC , and the cost at plant 2 is C2(Q2) = 50 + Q223oh3RQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==. Determine the quantity and price that maximize profits and the level of profits.

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:500- c, (8)100+2 82 euCart 2 日1 +24-253SA, 5 曰1 의50-2x100 P 500-6 1485 Pa Pf 14350

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