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62 6. Consider the market for sneakers with two firns, Like and Fuma. Both firms have to simultaneously decide between two strategies: Cooperate or Cheat If both firms choose Cooperate, they share the monopoly profit with each of them making $80m If one firm chooses to Cheat it makes a profit of $160m, while the other firm which chooses to Cooperate incurring a loss of $40m If both firms Cheat, they both make zero profit (a) Determine the payoffs for both firms in the payoff matrix for the normal form game below. Remember to enter Likes payoff as the first entry in each box. (4 marks) Fuma Cooperate Cheat Figure 1: Sneakers Game (b) Find the Nash equilibrium for this single-shot game? Is the Nash equilibrium outcome efficient? Explain. (4 marks)

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