The inverse market demand curve for bean sprouts is given
by
P(Y ) = 100−2Y , and the total cost function for any rm in the
industry
is given by TC(y) = 4y.
Suppose the 2 cournot firms operated in the market. What would the reaction function of each firm be?
If the two rms decided to collude, industry output would be
____
and the market price would equal _________
Suppose both of the colluding rms are producing equal amounts
of
output. If one of the colluding rms assumes that the other rm
would
not react to a change in industry output, what would happen to a
rm's
own pro ts if it increased its output by one unit? Profits
would
increase by ____
Suppose one rm acts as a Stackleberg leader and the other rm
behaves as a follower. The maximization problem for the leader can
be
written as ____________
Solving this problem results in the leader producing an output
of
____and the follower producing ____ . This implies an
industry
output of____and price of____
The inverse market demand curve for bean sprouts is given by P(Y ) = 100−2Y ,...
Please be descriptive. The inverse market demand curve for bean sprouts is given by P(Q) 100 2Q, and the marginal cost for any firm in the industry is $4. (a) (10 points) If the bean-sprout industry were perfectly competitive, what would be the industry output and the industry price? be the industry output would and the market price? as a follower. What would be the industry output would and the market price? (b) (20 points) If the firms were operating...
Oligopoly The inverse demand curve for brimstone is given by p(Y) 116-3Y (with Y total quantity of brimstone, measured in the conventional units) and the cost function for any firm in the industry is given by TC(y)-8y (with y the output of the firm) a. Determine the industry output and price if the brimstone industry were perfectly competitive Suppose that two Cournot firms operated in the market (Firm 1 and Firm 2) Determine the reaction function of Firm 1. Do...
Reference the following information about the market demand function for questions 1 to 15. These questions are on different types of market structures – monopoly, perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly market, and the Stackelberg oligopoly market. The market demand function is given the following equation: P = 1600 – Q where Q is the industry’s output level. Suppose initially this market is served by a single firm. Let the total cost function of this firm be given the function C(Q) =...
Suppose we have a market demand Q = 18 – P and a cost C(Q) 9) = 3Q?. (10 points) Suppose the two firms cannot collude and instead compete in the Cournot Model in the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q 18 – P) with the same cost (C(q) = -23. 2 a. Set up firm 1's profit maximization. b. Solve for firm 1's best response function. C. Solve for firm 1's quantity, firm 2's quantity,...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. (a) Assume a monopolist is operating in this market. (i) Calculate the quantity (qM) chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist. (ii) At the profit-maximizing quantity, what is the monopolistic market price (pM) of the product. (iii) Calculate the dead-weight loss (allocative inefficiency) associated with this monopoly market. Assume the market for this product is perfectly competitive. (i) Calculate the market-clearing output (qPC)...
Consider a market with Stackelberg competition. The inverse demand curve is P = a−b Q, with a=13 and b=3. Firm 1 is the leader and produces at constant marginal costs equal to zero. Firm 2 is the follower and has the cost function: C(q) = cq^2, with c=5. (Note the square on q). What is the equilibrium quantity of firm 1?
ECON M/C An industry has two firms. The demand curve for the industry's output is given by p = 370 – 24, where q is the total industry output. Each firm has a constant marginal cost equal to 10. Suppose that one firm is the Stackelberg leader and the other firm is the Stackelberg follower. The leader will choose quantity Select one: a. 80 b. 120 O C. 150 O d. 90 O e. None of the above.
Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p- 130-Q. Each has constant marginal cost equal to 4 and no fixed costs. Initially the two firms compete as Cournot rivals (Chapter 11) and each produces an output of 42. Why might these firms want to merge to form a monopoly? What reason would antitrust authorities have for opposing the merger? (Hint: Calculate price, profits, and total surplus before and after the merger.) The...
The inverse market demand is P=160 – 4Q. The firms have cost functions TC1 = 8+12q1+2q1² TC2 = 8+12q2+2q2² a. Determine monopoly profit-maximizing output for each firm. Determine the industry profit-maximizing output under collusion. Calculate the equilibrium price under collusion. Determine if the firms should collude. Assume your initial game is Cournot. Joint profits Profits Collusion = $1079.2 Profits Cournot = 1010.75 Profits Stackelberg = 971.17 Profit monopoly 1 = 904.67 Profits monopoly 2 = 904.67 Collude since...
Suppose that the only two firms in an industry face the market (inverse) demand curve p=160-q.Each has constant marginal cost equal to 16 and no fixed costs. Initially the two firms compete as Cournot rivals (Chapter 11) and each produces an output of 48.Why might these firms want to merge to form a monopoly? What reason would antitrust authorities have for opposing the merger? (Hint:Calculate price, profits, and total surplus before and after the merger.)Suppose that each firm has fixed...