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1\2 А. С х z 11,2 1, 12 2,10 16,3 10,5 6, 10 D QUESTION 3. (25 pts) Find all Nash equilibria for the game in Question 1. Rema

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Answer #1

Given :-

Player 2 1\2 х Z A 11,2 1, 12 C 2,10 16,3 D 10,5 6, 10 Player 1

Therefore, All Nash Equilibria using Sub - Game Nash Equilibrium method :-

A For Player I moves first A (11, 2) Ployer ! (2,10) Ployer 2 (10,5) Ployer! (1,12) Here, SPNE is 1,3) ie Alx N A Here, SPNE

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