QUESTION 1. (15 pts) Consider the game to the right. 1\2 А B с D 00D...

Question

Question

$QUESTION 1. (15 pts) Consider the game to the right. 1\2 А B с D 00D W Х 5,6 4,20 2,11 8,8 5, 10 18,2 12,0 5,8 Y 7,3 10,2 4,6$

Answer 1

Answer #1

Best responce of a player is a strategy or a action that leads the maximum payoff to a player given the strategy of other player.

Player 1:

For payoff 12 Best response to w is (D)

For payoff 18 Best response to x is (C)

For payoff 10 Best response to y is (B)

For payoff 10 Best response to z is (D)

Player 2:

For payoff 20 Best response to A is (X)

For payoff 11 Best response to B is (W)

For payoff 10 Best response to C is (W)

For payoff 16 Best response to D is (Y)

Answer 2

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