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7. Consider the normal-form game pictured here: 1 x 2,0 y 1,3 z 5,x A B...
1 Consider the game to the right. 1\2 A B Player 1: W X Y Z 6,5 11,2 10,5 1, 12 20,4 8,8 2, 18 8,5 3, 7 2, 10 6,4 16,3 11,7 10,5 1,6 6, 10 С D Best Response to W. Best Response to X Best Response to Y Best Response to Z Player 2: Best Response to A Best Response to B. Best Response to C Best Response to D.
Q.2 Consider the following normal-form game: Player 2 Player 1 3,2 1,1 -1,3 R. 0,0 Q.2.a Identify the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Q.2.b Identify the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria Q.2.c Calculate each player's expected equilibrium payoff.
Game 1 X Y 6,2 2,1 1,3 5,2 ,1 3,3 Z 3,3 C 4 1,2 2. In Game 1, if 0-2 = (1/4, 74, 12), what is BR2(0-2)?
Problem 2: Consider the following normal form game: | A | B | C D L 2 ,3 -1,3 0,0 4,3 M -1,0 3,0 / 0,10 2,0 R 1,1 | 2,1 3,1 3,1 Part a: What are the pure strategies that are strictly dominated in the above game? Part 6: What are the rationalizable strategies for each player? What are all the rationalizable strategy profiles? Part c: Find all of the Nash equilibria of the game above.
Game Theory 7. Consider the following normal form game 1 2 A B A 1,4 2,0 B 0,8 3,9 Determine all of the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed) for this game.
Find all Nash equilibria of the following game. X Y Z A | 2,2 4,0 1,3 B 1,3 6,0 1,0 0 3,1 3,3 2,2
1. Consider the following normal form game: 112 L CR T 10 102 12 0 13 M 12 25 5 0 0 B|13 010 011 a) (Level A) First suppose this game is played only once. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria? (b) (Level B) Now suppose this game is played twice. Players observe the actions chosen in the first period prior to the second period. Each player's total payoff is the sum of his/her payoff in the two...
1. Consider the following normal form game 112 L CR T|10 1012 1210 13 M 12 25 5 0 (0 B113 0100 (a) (Level A) First suppose this game is played only once. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria? (b) (Level B) Now suppose this game is played twice. Players observe the actions chosen in the first period prior to the second period. Each player's total payoff is the sum of his/her payoff in the two periods. Consider the...
1. Consider the following normal form game: 112 LC R T10 102 12 0 13 M 12 25 5 0 0 В|13 010 0111 (a) (Level A) First suppose this game is played only once. What are the pure strategy Nash equilibria? b) (Level B) Now suppose this game is played twice. Players observe the actions chosen in the first period prior to the second period. Each player's total payoff is the sum of his/her payoff in the two periods....
Find all mixed strategy Nash Equilibria of the following game: X Y Z A 2,2 4,0 1,3 B 1,3 6,0 1,0 C 3,1 3,3 2,2