Game Theory 7. Consider the following normal form game 1 2 A B A 1,4 2,0...

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Question

7. Consider the following normal form game 1 2 A B A 1,4 2,0 B 0,8 3,9 Determine all of the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed) Game Theory

Answer 1

Answer #1

Sol- Give normal foom game + B (Player 2) A 14 2,0 (Player 1) B 10,8 3,9 It player 1 choose A, & player 2 will choose. Then

Answer 2

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