Question

Suppose a second firm enters the market described in question 1 (market demand is still Q = 18 – P) with the same cost (CQ) = Q?). a. If the two firms successful collude what is the equilibrium market quantity and price? b. If the two firms successfully collude what is the joint profit? c. What do we call a collusion of firms? d. Why do we not usually see successful collusion of firms?

Answer 1

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d)

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