Question

Suppose that demand in a given market is given by P = 439 - Q and marginal costs are constant, with MC = 147. Assume that fix

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Answer #1

A) Monopolist equilibrium occurs at where MR= MC

MR=439-2Q

MC=147

439-2Q=147

Q=292/2=146

P=439-146=293

Profit=(293-147)*146=146*146=21,316

B)given firm 2 move collude, best move for firm 1 is to compete.

Given firm 2 move compete ,best move for firm 1 is to compete.

So firm 1 has a dominant strategy of to compete.

Similarly ,firm 2 has also a dominant strategy of to compete.

C)when both firm choose to collude, then joint profit maximize and equal to 21,316.

It is because ,both firms jointly produce Monopoly output,that maximize profit.

Challenge

Given one firm me ve collude , other firm always has an incentive to increase output and choose to compete , and increase its individual payoff.

D)The commitment should be like this.

If any firm choose to increase output than collude output, then in next period ,other firm will play grim strategy and also choose to increase output and will stay at that level. Thus this result in Decrease in both firm profit.

Knowing this no firm would try to increase output from collude level.

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