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Question 2 6 pts There are 3 firms setting quantities simultaneously. The inverse demand is p=a-...
Consider a market where N firms produce a homogeneous product and compete by simultaneously setting quantities....
Consider a market where N firms produce a homogeneous product and compete by simultaneously setting quantities. The inverse demand function has the general form P PO-P(qi +q2 +q3 + + qv), where Q is total quantity produced, qi is the quantity produced by firm i and P is the market price. The demand curve is downward sloping, so P10 < 0. The total cost of firm i is given by Cig). (0) Show that P- MC qi i , where...
Q.2 Two firms produce homogeneous products. The inverse demand function is: p(x1,x2)-a-x1- x2, where x is...
Q.2 Two firms produce homogeneous products. The inverse demand function is: p(x1,x2)-a-x1- x2, where x is the quantity chosen by firm 1, x2 the quantity chosen by firm 2, and a > 0. The cost functions are C1 (x1)-x follower. and C2(x2)- . Firm I is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2 a Stackelberg Q.2.a Find the subgame-perfect quantities. Q.2.b Calculate each firm's equilibrium profit.
Two firms figure out that the market inverse demand is P= 81 - Q. Each firm...
Two firms figure out that the market inverse demand is P= 81 - Q. Each firm has the cost C(Q)= Q^2. 1. Find the marginal revenue for the individual firms. 2. What is the reaction function for each firm? 3.What is the equilibrium quantity? 4. What is the market price? 5. How much profit does each firm make? 6. In the long-run what do you expect to happen in a market with profits like this? Find the optimal production for...
e&f only Problem 3 Consider two quantity-setting firms that produce a homogeneous good. The inverse demand...
e&f only
Problem 3 Consider two quantity-setting firms that produce a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function for the good is p = A-(qitqd. Each firm i has a cost function C (a) what is the Nash eajuilibrium if both firms choose their Чuantities simultaneously? What are the equilibrium profits of the two firms? (b) Suppose that firm 1 can switch to a new technology under which its cost function becomes Ci F + g2/2. The cost function of firm...
3. Cournot competition: The inverse demand for a homogeneous good is given by p(Q) = 100...
3. Cournot competition: The inverse demand for a homogeneous good is given by p(Q) = 100 - Q if Q< 100 and p(Q) = 0 if Q > 100, where p is the price in the market and Q > 0 is the total quantity supplied in the market. There are two firms, labeled 1 and 2, each of which produce the good at a constant marginal cost of 10 per unit. There are no fixed costs. Denoting the output...
Q4. There are two firms A and B in a homogenous product industry. Inverse demand is...
Q4. There are two firms A and B in a homogenous product industry. Inverse demand is P = 120 Q where Q is the combined output of the firms. Firm A has a marginal cost of 0 and firm B has a marginal cost of 10. There is an infinite sequence of periods in which firms simultaneously set prices. In this question we will consider whether the following collusive strategies with trigger strategy punish- ments are a subgame perfect Nash...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
Problem 4. Three firms operate in an oligopoly market with inverse demand function given by D(Q)a...
Problem 4. Three firms operate in an oligopoly market with inverse demand function given by D(Q)a Q, where Q- 1 42 +q3 and q, represents the quantity produced by firm i. Each firm has constant marginal cost of production c and no fixed cost, assume that 0<c<a. The firms compete in the market by choosing quantities in the following way. Firm 1, the industry leader, chooses gi20. Firms 2 and 3 both observe qi. Firm 2 then chooses q2 2...
Can someone help with the problem below? Suppose two oligopolistic firms face a market (inverse) demand curve P(Y + Y2...
Can someone help with the problem below?
Suppose two oligopolistic firms face a market (inverse) demand curve P(Y + Y2) = 20 - (Y1 + Y). Both firms produce at constant marginal cost, but they are not symmetric: firm 1 has marginal cost 2 and firm 2 has marginal cost 4. For each of the following competitive situations below, compute: • The equilibrium price. • The equilibrium quantities produced by each firm. • The profits received by each firm. (a)...
Duopoly, quantity-setting firms face the market demand p = 270 - Q. Each firm has a...
Duopoly, quantity-setting firms face the market demand p = 270 - Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $30 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (91) and Firm 2 (92) are 91 = units and 92 = units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)
Consider a market where N firms produce a homogeneous product and compete by simultaneously setting quantities. The inverse demand function has the general form P PO-P(qi +q2 +q3 + + qv), where Q is total quantity produced, qi is the quantity produced by firm i and P is the market price. The demand curve is downward sloping, so P10 < 0. The total cost of firm i is given by Cig). (0) Show that P- MC qi i , where...
Q.2 Two firms produce homogeneous products. The inverse demand function is: p(x1,x2)-a-x1- x2, where x is the quantity chosen by firm 1, x2 the quantity chosen by firm 2, and a > 0. The cost functions are C1 (x1)-x follower. and C2(x2)- . Firm I is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2 a Stackelberg Q.2.a Find the subgame-perfect quantities. Q.2.b Calculate each firm's equilibrium profit.
e&f only
Problem 3 Consider two quantity-setting firms that produce a homogeneous good. The inverse demand function for the good is p = A-(qitqd. Each firm i has a cost function C (a) what is the Nash eajuilibrium if both firms choose their Чuantities simultaneously? What are the equilibrium profits of the two firms? (b) Suppose that firm 1 can switch to a new technology under which its cost function becomes Ci F + g2/2. The cost function of firm...
3. Cournot competition: The inverse demand for a homogeneous good is given by p(Q) = 100 - Q if Q< 100 and p(Q) = 0 if Q > 100, where p is the price in the market and Q > 0 is the total quantity supplied in the market. There are two firms, labeled 1 and 2, each of which produce the good at a constant marginal cost of 10 per unit. There are no fixed costs. Denoting the output...
Q4. There are two firms A and B in a homogenous product industry. Inverse demand is P = 120 Q where Q is the combined output of the firms. Firm A has a marginal cost of 0 and firm B has a marginal cost of 10. There is an infinite sequence of periods in which firms simultaneously set prices. In this question we will consider whether the following collusive strategies with trigger strategy punish- ments are a subgame perfect Nash...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
Problem 4. Three firms operate in an oligopoly market with inverse demand function given by D(Q)a Q, where Q- 1 42 +q3 and q, represents the quantity produced by firm i. Each firm has constant marginal cost of production c and no fixed cost, assume that 0<c<a. The firms compete in the market by choosing quantities in the following way. Firm 1, the industry leader, chooses gi20. Firms 2 and 3 both observe qi. Firm 2 then chooses q2 2...
Can someone help with the problem below?
Suppose two oligopolistic firms face a market (inverse) demand curve P(Y + Y2) = 20 - (Y1 + Y). Both firms produce at constant marginal cost, but they are not symmetric: firm 1 has marginal cost 2 and firm 2 has marginal cost 4. For each of the following competitive situations below, compute: • The equilibrium price. • The equilibrium quantities produced by each firm. • The profits received by each firm. (a)...
Duopoly, quantity-setting firms face the market demand p = 270 - Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $30 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (91) and Firm 2 (92) are 91 = units and 92 = units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)
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