Two firms figure out that the market inverse demand is P= 81 - Q. Each firm has the cost C(Q)= Q^2.
1. Find the marginal revenue for the individual firms.
2. What is the reaction function for each firm?
3.What is the equilibrium quantity?
4. What is the market price?
5. How much profit does each firm make?
6. In the long-run what do you expect to happen in a market with profits like this? Find the optimal production for the following duopolists:
7. Find the marginal revenue, marginal cost, and optimal production in a duopoly market with inverse demand,
P= 36 - 3Q, and production costs, C(q1)= 3q^2 and C(q2)=6 * q^2.
Two firms figure out that the market inverse demand is P= 81 - Q. Each firm...
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 120-2Q. The total cost function for each firm is TC1(Q) = 4Q1. The total cost function for firm 2 is TC2(Q) = 2Q2. What is the output of each firm? Find: Q1 = ? Q2 = ?
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot duopolists. Inverse market demand is given by P 30 Q. Firm 1 has a marginal cost of 5 per unit. Firm 2's marginal cost is c2<5. (a) Suppose that c2 falls. What will happen to the Cournot equilibriumi) price, (ii) consumer surplus and total surplus, and (ii) the HHI? Explain your answer. (b) How does this example relate to criticisms of the use of...
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand p=210-Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. What is the Cournot equilibrium? The Cournot Equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q1) and Firm 2 (q2) are: q1= __ units and q2 =__ units . (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) The Cournot equilibrium price is p=$__ (two decimal places)
Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC(Q) 60Q Market Inverse Demand is: Pp (Q)824 0.6Q After the duopolists meet secretly and agree to evenly split the profit-maximizing output, Firm 1 decides to break the monopoly-splitting agreement and change its output to maximize its own profit. What will be the net loss of profit for the two firms to the nearest dollar?
Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC(Q) 60Q Market Inverse Demand is: Pp (Q)824 0.6Q...
Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC (Q) 600 Market Inverse Demand is: Po (Q)-824 0.6Q After the duopolists meet secretly and agree to evenly split the profit-maximizing output, Firm 1 decides to break the monopoly-splitting agreement and change its output to maximize its own profit. What will be the reduction in price for both firms to the nearest dollar? (Subtract the new price from the monopoly price]
Two duopoly firms each have a cost function: TC (Q)...
2. Suppose the market demand curve is P = 40 − 3Q and all firms in the industry face M C = 4 and have no fixed costs. For each of the following situations, calculate the five items: Market Price , Quantity per firm ,Profits per firm ,Consumer Surplus ,Deadweight Loss (a) Uniform pricing monopolist P = Q = π = CS = DWL = (b) Cournot Duopoly P= Q1 = Q2 = π 1 = π2...
2. Consider a market with inverse demand P (Q) = 100 - Q. Assume there are two different duopolies serving it. Duopoly D1 has two firms having unit costs c1 = 6 and c2 = 2, and duopoly D2 has two (symmetric) firms both having unit cost c = 4. (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium in each duopoly. (b) Compare the equilibrium total outputs and market prices in the two duopolies. (c) Compare the equilibrium consumer surplus, total firm revenue,...
Demand in a market dominated by two firms (a Cournot duopoly) is determined according to: P = 300 – 4(Q1 + Q2), where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded by Firm 1, and Q2 is the quantity demanded by Firm 2. The marginal cost and average cost for each firm is constant; AC=MC = $74. The cournot-duopoly equilibrium profit for each firm is
Two firms are producing identical goods in a market characterized by the inverse demand curve P = 120 – 4Q, where Q is the sum of Firm 1's and Firm 2's output, q1 + q2. Each firm's marginal cost is constant at $20. Graph the reaction function for each firm and indicate the Nash equilibrium.