Answer 4(a) : Since, the existing market condition states that the marginal cost of firm C2 is lesser than $5 and the marginal cost of firm C1 is $5, this means that Firm 2 is already enjoying a benefit in comparison to firm 1, as it will earn better revenue, due to its marginal cost being comparatively lesser.
(i) Now, if C2 further falls, this would mean that the price prevailing in the Cournot equilibrium will fall. Firm C2 will try to earn better profit and would want to divert all the consumers to it, and hence reduce the price of the commodity.
(ii) As a result of the reduction in the Cournot equilibrium price, the consumers will now have the option to buy the same product at a comparatively lesser price, and the consumers will move to buying the cheaper product. This will lead to an increase in the surplus availability at the hands of the consumer. Total surplus will fall in the short run. As the surplus of Firm 1 will be will fall drastically, as its marginal cost is still the same and the surplus of Firm 2 will also fall, as in order to attract more consumers, firm 2 has reduced the price. Therefore, even though consumer surplus will increase, but Total surplus will fall.
(iii) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI will remain the same as with the fall in the profit share of firm 1 , the profit share of firm 2 will increase, thus squaring off the deficit as per the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. However, the index will now show a difference in the level of output and revenue of the firm 1 as lesser as compared to earlier and the level of output and revenue of the firm 2 as greater as compared to earlier
Answer 4(b) : It has been critically examined by economists all over the world that this method of reduction in the cost, either of marginal cost, or b bearing initial loss, is being used by several firms to identify the market power. When some firms are trying to enter the market, or for firms who are already in the market, they reduce the price of the commodity in order to test out the power of sustainability of the other firms who are in competition. The reduction of prices proves which firms can survive even at a lesser revenue. In this process, many smaller firms pull out of the market, and only those players survive, who maintain a greater share of capital or revenue.
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot...
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
Two firms, Acme and Roadco, produce anvils, and compete with each other as Cournot oligopolists (i.e. they compete in quantities). The (inverse) demand for anvils is given by P(Q)=500-3Q. Both firms have constant marginal costs of MC=50 and no fixed costs. Hint: the partial derivative of (c-bX-bY)X with respect to X is c-2bX-bY. What is the equilibrium consumer and producer surplus in the market? (5 points)
1. Consider the following asymmetric version of the Cournot duopoly model. Two firms compete by simultaneously choosing the quantities (q, and q2) they produce. Their products are homogeneous, and market demand is given by p- 260-2Q, where Q-q +q2. Firm 1 has a cost advantage; Firm 1 produces at zero cost, while Firm 2 produces at a constant average cost of 40. (The difference in costs is what makes this an asymmetric game.) a. Derive both firms' profit functions, as...
Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 120-2Q. The total cost function for each firm is TC1(Q) = 4Q1. The total cost function for firm 2 is TC2(Q) = 2Q2. What is the output of each firm? Find: Q1 = ? Q2 = ?
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 – 6Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Please show steps.
Please answer step by step: Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P= 400-2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.
An industry consists of two Cournot firms selling a homogeneous product with a market demand curve given by P=100-Q1-Q2. Each firm has a marginal cost of $10 per unit. (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices. (b) What is the Bertrand equilibrium price in this market? (c) Find the quantities and price that would prevail if the firms acted as if they were a monopolist (I.e. find the collusive outcome) and then find the equilibrium price and quantity that...
Consider a market where N firms produce a homogeneous product and compete by simultaneously setting quantities. The inverse demand function has the general form P PO-P(qi +q2 +q3 + + qv), where Q is total quantity produced, qi is the quantity produced by firm i and P is the market price. The demand curve is downward sloping, so P10 < 0. The total cost of firm i is given by Cig). (0) Show that P- MC qi i , where...
15.2 where a, b > 0 a. Suppose that firms' marginal and average costs are constant and equal to c and that inverse market demand is given by P = a - bQ. Calculate the profit-maximizing price-quantity combination for a monopolist. Also calculate the monopolist's profit. b. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities for Cournot duopolists, which choose quantities for their identical products simultaneously. Also compute market output, market price, and firm and industry profits. c. Calculate the Nash equilibrium prices...
Market demand for two sellers of homogeneous products is Q = 10 - 2P. Each has marginal cost c = 1. Suppose they compete as capacity-constrained Bertrand duopolists. A) Calculate the equilibrium capacities, prices, and profits. B) Now suppose they compete as Cournot duopolists. Calculate the equilibrium quantities, price, and profits. C) Compare the two equilibria.