An industry consists of two Cournot firms selling a homogeneous product with a market demand curve...
An industry consists of two Cournot firms selling a homogeneous product with a market demand curve given by P=100-Q1-Q2. Each firm has a marginal cost of $10 per unit.
(a) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices.
(b) What is the Bertrand equilibrium price in this market?
(c) Find the quantities and price that would prevail if the firms acted as if they were a monopolist (I.e. find the collusive outcome) and then find the equilibrium price and quantity that would prevail if the market were perfectly competitive.
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An industry consists of two Cournot firms selling a homogeneous
product with a market demand curve...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function. P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function. P = 500 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $100 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Show the detail of your work and summarize your results in a table. Outputs Profits il= Cournot 12= Stackelberg Ql= Q2= Q1= Q2= Ql= Q2=...
2. Suppose the market demand curve is P = 40 − 3Q and all firms in...
2. Suppose the market demand curve is P = 40 − 3Q and all firms in the industry face M C = 4 and have no fixed costs. For each of the following situations, calculate the five items: Market Price , Quantity per firm ,Profits per firm ,Consumer Surplus ,Deadweight Loss (a) Uniform pricing monopolist P = Q = π = CS = DWL = (b) Cournot Duopoly P= Q1 = Q2 = π 1 = π2...
Please show step by step. Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product...
Please show step by step.
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P= 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this Information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round Intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm:...
A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by P a - Q, where...
A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by P a - Q, where QQ Q2 and a>300. Both firms have constant marginal costs MC-100. There are no fixed costs. a) What is firm 1's optimal quantity given that firm 2 produces an output of 50 units per year? And what is firm's 1 quantity if firm 2 produces 20 units? [4 marks] b) Derive the equation of each firm's reaction function and provide a graphical explanation to...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 – 6Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Please show steps.
Suppose there are two firms in a market producing differentiated products. Both firms have MC=0. The...
Suppose there are two firms in a market producing differentiated products. Both firms have MC=0. The demand for firm 1 and 2’s products are given by: q1(p1,p2) = 5 - 2p1 + p2 q2(p1,p2) = 5 - 2p2 + p1 a. First, suppose that the two firms compete in prices (i.e. Bertrand). Compute and graph each firm’s best response functions. What is the sign of the slope of the firms’ best-response functions? Are prices strategic substitutes or complements? b. Solve...
can someone help me with question 9? QUESTION 9 A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market...
can someone help me with question 9?
QUESTION 9 A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by P-a-Q, where Q Q1 + Q2 and a-300. Both firms have constant marginal costs MC-100. There are no fixed costs a) What is firm 1's optimal quantity given that firm 2 produces an output of 50 units per year? And what is frm's 1 quantity if firm 2 produces 20 units? 4 marks) b) Derive the equation of each firm's...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of...
Consider an (inverse) demand curve P = 30 - Q. And a total cost curve of C(Q) = 12Q. (a) Assume a monopolist is operating in this market. (i) Calculate the quantity (qM) chosen by a profit-maximizing monopolist. (ii) At the profit-maximizing quantity, what is the monopolistic market price (pM) of the product. (iii) Calculate the dead-weight loss (allocative inefficiency) associated with this monopoly market. Assume the market for this product is perfectly competitive. (i) Calculate the market-clearing output (qPC)...
Exercise 5 An industry consists of two firms. The demand function for the product of firm...
Exercise 5 An industry consists of two firms. The demand function for the product of firm i is qí = 24-5Pi+2pj. The marginal cost of production for each firm is zero. For what values of the discount factor will grim punishment strategies-with reversion to Bertrand-Nash prices-support a collusive agree- ment to marimize joint profits?
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot...
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot duopolists. Inverse market demand is given by P 30 Q. Firm 1 has a marginal cost of 5 per unit. Firm 2's marginal cost is c2<5. (a) Suppose that c2 falls. What will happen to the Cournot equilibriumi) price, (ii) consumer surplus and total surplus, and (ii) the HHI? Explain your answer. (b) How does this example relate to criticisms of the use of...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function. P = 500 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $100 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Show the detail of your work and summarize your results in a table. Outputs Profits il= Cournot 12= Stackelberg Ql= Q2= Q1= Q2= Ql= Q2=...
Please show step by step.
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P= 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this Information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round Intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm:...
A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by P a - Q, where QQ Q2 and a>300. Both firms have constant marginal costs MC-100. There are no fixed costs. a) What is firm 1's optimal quantity given that firm 2 produces an output of 50 units per year? And what is firm's 1 quantity if firm 2 produces 20 units? [4 marks] b) Derive the equation of each firm's reaction function and provide a graphical explanation to...
can someone help me with question 9?
QUESTION 9 A homogeneous products duopoly faces a market demand function given by P-a-Q, where Q Q1 + Q2 and a-300. Both firms have constant marginal costs MC-100. There are no fixed costs a) What is firm 1's optimal quantity given that firm 2 produces an output of 50 units per year? And what is frm's 1 quantity if firm 2 produces 20 units? 4 marks) b) Derive the equation of each firm's...
Exercise 5 An industry consists of two firms. The demand function for the product of firm i is qí = 24-5Pi+2pj. The marginal cost of production for each firm is zero. For what values of the discount factor will grim punishment strategies-with reversion to Bertrand-Nash prices-support a collusive agree- ment to marimize joint profits?
4. (12 MARKS -6 FOR EACH PART) Two firms produce homogeneous products and compete as Cournot duopolists. Inverse market demand is given by P 30 Q. Firm 1 has a marginal cost of 5 per unit. Firm 2's marginal cost is c2<5. (a) Suppose that c2 falls. What will happen to the Cournot equilibriumi) price, (ii) consumer surplus and total surplus, and (ii) the HHI? Explain your answer. (b) How does this example relate to criticisms of the use of...
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