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Exercise 5 An industry consists of two firms. The demand function for the product of firm...
Q4. There are two firms A and B in a homogenous product industry. Inverse demand is...
Q4. There are two firms A and B in a homogenous product industry. Inverse demand is P = 120 Q where Q is the combined output of the firms. Firm A has a marginal cost of 0 and firm B has a marginal cost of 10. There is an infinite sequence of periods in which firms simultaneously set prices. In this question we will consider whether the following collusive strategies with trigger strategy punish- ments are a subgame perfect Nash...
An industry consists of two Cournot firms selling a homogeneous product with a market demand curve...
An industry consists of two Cournot firms selling a homogeneous product with a market demand curve given by P=100-Q1-Q2. Each firm has a marginal cost of $10 per unit. (a) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and prices. (b) What is the Bertrand equilibrium price in this market? (c) Find the quantities and price that would prevail if the firms acted as if they were a monopolist (I.e. find the collusive outcome) and then find the equilibrium price and quantity that...
PRACTICE PROBLEMS FOR WEEK 6 Question: [Collusion when firms compete over time] Suppose two firms producing...
PRACTICE PROBLEMS FOR WEEK 6 Question: [Collusion when firms compete over time] Suppose two firms producing differentiated goods compete every day through prices. The demand for the good produced by firm i E {1,2} is qi = 24 – 5pi + 2p;. Firms can produce the goods with a constant marginal cost of production of O per unit. Hence, firm i's profit is given by T(Pi, p;) = (pi – 0) (24 – 5p; + 2p;). (a) What are firm...
Two firms in an industry engaged in Bertrand competition. The industry inverse demand function is p...
Two firms in an industry engaged in Bertrand competition. The industry inverse demand function is p = 40 - 2Q, and marginal cost is MC = 10 for both firms. No firm faces capacity constraints. Find the BertrandNash equilibrium (prices, quantities, profits consumer surplus, total surplus, herfindahl index and lerner index)
Please show step by step. Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product...
Please show step by step.
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P= 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this Information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round Intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm:...
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete à la Bertrand. The demand...
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete à la Bertrand. The demand function is given by q() = 250 - 7p. The cost function is the same for both firms and it is C(q) = 100; for all i E {1,2,3,4} • Write explicitly the demand and profit functions of 1, 2, 3, and 4. • Derive best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the game. (9) = 591, what • If firm 1 find...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 – 6Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Please show steps.
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function. P...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function. P = 500 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $100 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Show the detail of your work and summarize your results in a table. Outputs Profits il= Cournot 12= Stackelberg Ql= Q2= Q1= Q2= Ql= Q2=...
consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There are two firms that produce a homogenous...
consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There
are two firms that produce a homogenous good with the same constant
marginal cost of c.
a) Suppose that the rule for splitting up cunsumers when the
prices are equal assigns all consumers to firm1 when both firms
charge the same price. show that (p1,p2) =(c,c) is a Nash
equilibrium and that no other pair of prices is a Nash
equilibrium.
b) Now, we assume that the Bertrand game in part...
An industry consists of two firms with identical demand function ? = 100 − ??, where...
An industry consists of two firms with identical demand function ? = 100 − ??, where ?? = ?1 + ?2. Both firms have identical cost ?? = 40??, where ? = 1,2. Both firms pay attention to the behaviour of their competitor in determining the output produced, and both firms make their decision simultaneously (no one moves first). (a) If both firms decide to compete in determining their outputs, find the profit maximizing q and P and calculate the...
Q4. There are two firms A and B in a homogenous product industry. Inverse demand is P = 120 Q where Q is the combined output of the firms. Firm A has a marginal cost of 0 and firm B has a marginal cost of 10. There is an infinite sequence of periods in which firms simultaneously set prices. In this question we will consider whether the following collusive strategies with trigger strategy punish- ments are a subgame perfect Nash...
PRACTICE PROBLEMS FOR WEEK 6 Question: [Collusion when firms compete over time] Suppose two firms producing differentiated goods compete every day through prices. The demand for the good produced by firm i E {1,2} is qi = 24 – 5pi + 2p;. Firms can produce the goods with a constant marginal cost of production of O per unit. Hence, firm i's profit is given by T(Pi, p;) = (pi – 0) (24 – 5p; + 2p;). (a) What are firm...
Please show step by step.
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P= 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this Information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round Intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm:...
Exercise 5 Let us consider a market where 4 firms compete à la Bertrand. The demand function is given by q() = 250 - 7p. The cost function is the same for both firms and it is C(q) = 100; for all i E {1,2,3,4} • Write explicitly the demand and profit functions of 1, 2, 3, and 4. • Derive best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the game. (9) = 591, what • If firm 1 find...
Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function. P = 500 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $100 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Show the detail of your work and summarize your results in a table. Outputs Profits il= Cournot 12= Stackelberg Ql= Q2= Q1= Q2= Ql= Q2=...
consider the standard Bertrand model of price competition. There
are two firms that produce a homogenous good with the same constant
marginal cost of c.
a) Suppose that the rule for splitting up cunsumers when the
prices are equal assigns all consumers to firm1 when both firms
charge the same price. show that (p1,p2) =(c,c) is a Nash
equilibrium and that no other pair of prices is a Nash
equilibrium.
b) Now, we assume that the Bertrand game in part...
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