P = 20 - Q
TC = Q²+3Q+10
As there is a single firm so it is a monopolist
Profit = Total Revenue(TR) - Total Cost(TC)
Total Revenue= P*Q
TR= 20Q - Q²
Profit = 20Q - Q² - Q² - 3Q - 10
Profit = -2Q² + 17Q -10
This is the profit fucnction
For calculating output choice we must note that monopolist produce at that point where MR=MC
So MR = 20 - 2Q
MC = 2Q+3
MR = MC
20 - 2Q = 2Q + 3
4Q = 17
Q= 4.25
Thus monopolist will produce 4.5 units of output
Price charged will be
P = 20 - 4.25 = 15.75
Profit earned = P*Q - TC = 15.75* 4.25 - (4.25)² - 3(4.25) - 10
Profit = 66.9375 - 18.0625 - 12.75 - 10
Profit = 26.125
Thus monopolist will earn 26.125
PART I: Consider a market with the following demand: P(Q) = 20 - Q Assume that...
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