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i. Consider a Cournot duopo in a hoanogeneous product inarket where frm Is output isエand firm...
Now consider a typical Cournot duopoly situation such that the market is being served by two...
Now consider a typical Cournot duopoly situation such that the market is being served by two firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) that simultaneously decide on the level of output to sell in the market, while producing an identical product. The total output of the industry is Q = q1 + q2, where q1 and q2 are the output of Firm 1 and 2, respectively. Each firm has a symmetric cost function: C(q1) = 12 q1 and C(q2) = 12...
Consider a Cournot competition with two firms, A and B. The marginal costs of each firm...
Consider a Cournot competition with two firms, A and B. The marginal costs of each firm is MCA = MCB = 40. The inverse demand function is P = 130 - Q. Find the Nash equilibrium quantities for each firm and the market price.
Question 2 (60 points) Consider two following Cournot competition between two firms, Firm 1 and Firm...
Question 2 (60 points) Consider two following Cournot competition between two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. The firms face an inverse demand function P = 600-Q where Q = 91 + 92 is the total output. Each unit produced costs c-$60. Therefore the profit of each farmer is given by π1 (J1.qz) = (600-91-J2)a1-6091 712 (41,42) (600 q1 q2)42-6092 Each firm. i simultaneusly chooses own qi to maximize own profits πί. a) (15 points) Find the Cournot NE quantities...
Consider two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on...
Consider two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on the price of the product in a typical Bertrand fashion while producing an identical product. Both firms face the same cost function: C(qA) = 12qA and C(qB) = 12qB, where qA is the output of Firm A and qB is the output of Firm B. The demand curve is P = 30 - Q. (i) What will be the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price (pB) chosen...
I. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is...
I. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is P()-24 Q. Firm 1 has constant average and marginal costs of $12 per unit, while firms 2 and 3 have constant average and marginal costs of $15 per unit. p (Q) (a) Verify that the following are Nash equilibrium quantities for this market: q,-. and g2 = g3 We were unable to transcribe this image
4. A Consider Cournot model of oligopoly where each firm simultaneously makes a quantity decision. Let...
4. A Consider Cournot model of oligopoly where each firm simultaneously makes a quantity decision. Let yi and y2 denote the quantities 1 and 2, respectively. Let P(Y) = 100-Y be the market-clearing price when the aggregate quantity on the market is Y y1 +y2. Assume that the cost function of firm 1 and firm 2 are as follows. C1(n)-60y1 and C2(2) 60y2. (a) Write down the profit function of firm 1 and firm 2. (of a homogeneous product) produced...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
Consider a cournot model of a duopoly market where Firm X and Firm Y operate. Each...
Consider a cournot model of a duopoly market where Firm X and Firm Y operate. Each firm has marginal cost equal to $20, and the market demand is Q = 100 - (1/2) P. There are no fixed costs. a) Show the best-response function of each firm. b) Calculate the profit-maximizing output level for each firm. c) What is the equilibrium price? d) Calculate the profit for each firm.
consider a market with inverse demand curve p=400-4Q. costs per firm are given by C(q)= 16+10q+q^2...
consider a market with inverse demand curve p=400-4Q. costs per firm are given by C(q)= 16+10q+q^2 a) find the minimum efficient scale output level b) in a competitive market , how many firms will be active in the long-run c) suppose we have a cournot oligopoly with n firms . determine output of each firm and the equilibrium price d) find the long run equilibrium number of firms if the market is a cournot oligopoly and entry occurs until profit...
Consider two Cournot firms, Firm A and Firm B. Firm A has a marginal cost of...
Consider two Cournot firms, Firm A and Firm B. Firm A has a marginal cost of 10 and Firm B has a marginal cost of 5. They face the market inverse demand function: P=120-Q How many units will Firm A produce?
Question 2 (60 points) Consider two following Cournot competition between two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. The firms face an inverse demand function P = 600-Q where Q = 91 + 92 is the total output. Each unit produced costs c-$60. Therefore the profit of each farmer is given by π1 (J1.qz) = (600-91-J2)a1-6091 712 (41,42) (600 q1 q2)42-6092 Each firm. i simultaneusly chooses own qi to maximize own profits πί. a) (15 points) Find the Cournot NE quantities...
I. Consider a three firm (n = 3) Cournot oligopoly. The market inverse demand function is P()-24 Q. Firm 1 has constant average and marginal costs of $12 per unit, while firms 2 and 3 have constant average and marginal costs of $15 per unit. p (Q) (a) Verify that the following are Nash equilibrium quantities for this market: q,-. and g2 = g3 We were unable to transcribe this image
4. A Consider Cournot model of oligopoly where each firm simultaneously makes a quantity decision. Let yi and y2 denote the quantities 1 and 2, respectively. Let P(Y) = 100-Y be the market-clearing price when the aggregate quantity on the market is Y y1 +y2. Assume that the cost function of firm 1 and firm 2 are as follows. C1(n)-60y1 and C2(2) 60y2. (a) Write down the profit function of firm 1 and firm 2. (of a homogeneous product) produced...
4. Consider 2 firms selling fertilizer competing as Cournot duopolists. The inverse demand function facing the fertilizer market is P = 1 - where Q = 94 +98. For simplicity, assume that the long-run marginal cost for each firm is equal to X, i.e. C(q)=Xq for each firm. a) Find the Cournot Nash equilibrium where the firms choose output simultaneously b) Find the Stackelberg Nash Equilibrium where firm A as the Stackelberg leader. How much does the leader gain by...
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