Problem 5
Let the output of firm A is qa and output of firm b is qb
where Q=qa+qb
o, p=10-Q
p=10-qa-qb
Given TC=2+q
Marginal Cost=MC=dTC/dq=1
a)
Let us calculate the best response function in case of A
Profit of A=Ra=TRa-TCa=(10-qa-qb)*qa-MC*qa=10qa-qa2-qaqb-qaqb=9qa-qa2-qaqb
Put dRa/dqa=0 for profit maximization
dRa/dqa=9-2qa-qb=0
qa=(9-qb)/2=4.5-0.5qb
Now
Let us calculate the best response function in case of B
Profit of B=Rb=TRb-TCb=(10-qa-qb)*qb-MC*qb=10qb-qaqb-qb2-qaqb=9qb-qaqb-qb2
Put dRb/dqb=0 for profit maximization
dRb/dqb=9-qa-2qb=0
qb=(9-qa)/2=4.5-0.5qa
Put qa=4.5-0.5qb
qb=4.5-0.5*(4.5-0.5qb)=4.5-2.25+0.25qb
qb=2.25+0.25qb
0.75qb=2.25
qb=2.25/.75=3
qa=4.5-0.5qb=4.5-0.5*3=3
p=10-(qa+qb)=10-(3+3)=4
So, in case of Counot equilibrium, each firm produces 3 units and price is 4
Problem 6
a)
Given p=18-Q
Total Revenue=p*Q=(18-Q)*Q=18Q-Q2
Marginal Revenue=MR=dTR/dQ=18-2Q
We also know that
TC=2Q
Marginal Cost=MC=dTC/dQ=2
Set MR=MC for profit maximization
18-2Q=2Q
18=4Q
Q=4.50
Firm's optimal output is 4.50 units
P=18-Q=18-4.50=13.50
Total Revenue=TR=P*Q=13.50*4.5=60.75
Total Cost=TC=2*q=2*4.50=9
Profit=TR-TC=60.75-9=51.75
Now we calculate consumer surplus
Let us calculate the price at which Q=0
P=18-Q
Put Q=0
P=18-0=18
Consumer surplus is the area below demand curve and above equilibrium price
CS=(1/2)*(18-13.50)*(4.5-0)=10.125
b)
Let the firms are denoted by A and B
Let the output of firm A is qa and output of firm b is qb
where Q=qa+qb
o, p=18-Q
p=18-qa-qb
Given TC=2q
Marginal Cost=MC=dTC/dq=2
Let us calculate the best response function in case of A
Profit of A=Ra=TRa-TCa=(18-qa-qb)*qa-MC*qa=18qa-qa2-qaqb-2qaqb=16qa-qa2-qaqb
Put dRa/dqa=0 for profit maximization
dRa/dqa=16-2qa-qb=0
qa=(16-qb)/2=8-0.5qb
Let us calculate the best response function in case of B
Profit of B=Rb=TRb-TCb=(18-qa-qb)*qb-MC*qb=18qb-qaqb-qb2-2qaqb=16qb-qaqb-qb2
Put dRb/dqb=0 for profit maximization
dRb/dqb=16-qa-2qb=0
qb=(16-qa)/2=8-0.5qa
Put qa=8-0.5qb
qb=8-0.5*(8-0.5qb)=8-4+0.25qb
0.75qb=4
qb=5.33
qa=8-0.5qb=8-0.5*5.33=5.33
Q=qa+qb=5.33+5.33=10.66
P=18-Q=18-10.66=7.34
Total Profit=TR-TC=7.34*10.66-2*10.66=56.92
Consumer surplus is the area below demand curve and above equilibrium price
CS=(1/2)*(18-7.34)*(10.66-0)=56.82
Solve step by step please 5. Suppose the demand for pizza in a small isolated town...
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