Maximim for A=Max(Minimum in each Row)
=Max(-7,-5,3)
=3
Minimax of B=Min(Maximum in each column)
=Min(4,7,9,8)
=4
Maximum for A is called the lower value of the game and denoted by V and minimax of B is called the upper value of the game and denoted by
So here V=3 & =4
If V is the value of the game then always satisfies the inequality
Maximim for minimax for B
If =V=V then saddle point exist
But here V
so, here saddle point is not exist.
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