Homework Answers
First option for Player B is correct
Let player B selects LEFT with a probability of q and RIGHT with (1 - q).
According to the probabilities assigned
expected value of UP = expected value of DOWN
q + 4 - 4q = 2q + 3 - 3q
-3q + 4 = 3 - q
1 = 2q
q = 0.5
Hence the value of q is 0.5 and correct answer is option 1
Add Answer to:
(UP, DOWN) = (7/8, 1/8) Question 6 Assume the following game situation: If Player A plays...
Player 2 9 1-9 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1...
Player 2 9 1-9 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1 P A 1,3 2,4 1-PB 0,2 8,0 Suppose Player 1 plays A with probability p, and Player 2 plays X with probability q. Let E (-) and E2(-) be the expected payoff functions. 4)a) [8pt total] Calculate the following: 4)a)i) (2pt] E(A) = 4)a)ii) [2pt] E (B) = 4)a)iii) [2pt] E(X) = 4)a)iv) [2pt] E2(Y) = 4)b) (3pt] Indifference strategy for Player 1: Answer:...
1-4 Player 2 2 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1...
1-4 Player 2 2 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1 p A1, 32, 4 1-p B 0,28,0 Suppose Player 1 plays A with probability p, and Player 2 plays X with probability q. Let E1 (-) and E2(-) be the expected payoff functions. 4)a) [8pt total] Calculate the following: 4)a)i) (2pt] E1(A) 4)a) ii) (2pt] E1(B) 4)a) iii) [2pt] E2(X) = 4)a)iv) (2pt] E(Y) = 4)b) (3pt) Indifference strategy for Player 1: Answer: 4)c)...
onsider the following two person static game where Player 1 is the row player and Player...
onsider the following two person static game where Player 1 is the row player and Player 2 is the column player C D E A 1,1 0,2 2,0 B 0,0 1,-1 -1,3 a. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 3/4. b. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 2/3. c. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 1/2. d. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Consider the following two person static game where Player 1 is the row player and Player...
Consider the following two person static game where Player 1 is the row player and Player 2 is the column player C D A 1, 0,2 2,0 B 0,0 1,3 O a. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 3/4 O b. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium O c. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 2/3. O d. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0,0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players get...
NEED WITHIN THE HOUR! Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player A can...
NEED WITHIN THE HOUR!
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player
A can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player B can choose either
Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table where
the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on
the right is the payoff to Player B.
Does Player A have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Group of answer choices
Top is...
player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of...
player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of matching pennies as described above. If the pennies match player 2 pays player 1 $1 (both get head or tail). If the pennies are not matched player 1 pays player 2 $1 ( head , tail or tail , head). H represents heads and T represents Tails 1. (2 points) What is the set of strategies for each player? 2. (5 points) Is there...
Consider the following game. -2,-1 -2,2 8,8 Let a be the probability that P1 plays A...
Consider the following game. -2,-1 -2,2 8,8 Let a be the probability that P1 plays A (and 1-a be the probability they play B). Let 3 be the probability that P2 plays C (and 1- B be the probability that P2 plays D). Solve for the Mixed Strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Input your answer as a number to two decimal places, for example O.XX. What is the equilibrium value of B?
1. P1 and P2 play the game shown below. P1 believes that P2 will play Left with probability and Right with probability...
1. P1 and P2 play the game shown below. P1 believes that P2 will play Left with probability and Right with probability 2. Find the expected payoff for P1 if P1 plays Top and Bottom with equal probability. (2 points) Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Тор 4, 1 0,0 Bottom 2, 5 1,0 2. Find all the strategy profiles that are Pareto efficient for the game shown below.(2 points) Player 2 Left Middle Right 1,0 Player 1 Up 4,...
GAME MATRIX Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (...
GAME MATRIX
Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Consider two players (Rose as player...
Player 2 9 1-9 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1 P A 1,3 2,4 1-PB 0,2 8,0 Suppose Player 1 plays A with probability p, and Player 2 plays X with probability q. Let E (-) and E2(-) be the expected payoff functions. 4)a) [8pt total] Calculate the following: 4)a)i) (2pt] E(A) = 4)a)ii) [2pt] E (B) = 4)a)iii) [2pt] E(X) = 4)a)iv) [2pt] E2(Y) = 4)b) (3pt] Indifference strategy for Player 1: Answer:...
1-4 Player 2 2 Question 4: (15pt total] Consider the following game: X Y Player 1 p A1, 32, 4 1-p B 0,28,0 Suppose Player 1 plays A with probability p, and Player 2 plays X with probability q. Let E1 (-) and E2(-) be the expected payoff functions. 4)a) [8pt total] Calculate the following: 4)a)i) (2pt] E1(A) 4)a) ii) (2pt] E1(B) 4)a) iii) [2pt] E2(X) = 4)a)iv) (2pt] E(Y) = 4)b) (3pt) Indifference strategy for Player 1: Answer: 4)c)...
Consider the following two person static game where Player 1 is the row player and Player 2 is the column player C D A 1, 0,2 2,0 B 0,0 1,3 O a. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 3/4 O b. There is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium O c. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability 2/3. O d. There is an equilibrium where Player 1 plays A with probability...
Consider a game being played between player 1 and player 2. Player 1 can choose T or B. Player 2 can take actions Lor R. These choices are made simultaneously. The payoffs are as follows. If 1 plays T and 2 plays L, the payoffs are (0,0) for Player 1 and 2, respectively. If 1 opts of B and 2 L, the payoffs are (5,7). If 1 plays T and 2 R, the payoffs are (6,2). Finally, both players get...
NEED WITHIN THE HOUR!
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player
A can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player B can choose either
Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table where
the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on
the right is the payoff to Player B.
Does Player A have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Group of answer choices
Top is...
player 2 H T player 1 H 1,-1 -1,1 T -1,1 1,-1 Consider a game of matching pennies as described above. If the pennies match player 2 pays player 1 $1 (both get head or tail). If the pennies are not matched player 1 pays player 2 $1 ( head , tail or tail , head). H represents heads and T represents Tails 1. (2 points) What is the set of strategies for each player? 2. (5 points) Is there...
Consider the following game. -2,-1 -2,2 8,8 Let a be the probability that P1 plays A (and 1-a be the probability they play B). Let 3 be the probability that P2 plays C (and 1- B be the probability that P2 plays D). Solve for the Mixed Strategy Nash equilibria of this game. Input your answer as a number to two decimal places, for example O.XX. What is the equilibrium value of B?
1. P1 and P2 play the game shown below. P1 believes that P2 will play Left with probability and Right with probability 2. Find the expected payoff for P1 if P1 plays Top and Bottom with equal probability. (2 points) Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Тор 4, 1 0,0 Bottom 2, 5 1,0 2. Find all the strategy profiles that are Pareto efficient for the game shown below.(2 points) Player 2 Left Middle Right 1,0 Player 1 Up 4,...
GAME MATRIX
Consider two players (Rose as player 1 and Kalum as player 2) in which each player has 2 possible actions (Up or Down for Rose; Left or Right for Kalum. This can be represented by a 2x2 game with 8 different numbers (the payoffs). Write out three different games such that: (a) There are zero pure-strategy Nash equilibria. (b) There is exactly one pure-strategy equilibrium. (c) There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Consider two players (Rose as player...
Most questions answered within 3 hours.
-
Minitab Problem: Take the Lake Hume June rainfall data and find
use the processes outlined in...
asked 41 minutes ago -
X Company is trying to decide whether to continue using old
equipment to make Product A...
asked 42 minutes ago -
IN PYTHON ONLY !! Program 2: Re-work
program #5 (WeeklyHours) from the previous assignment such that...
asked 1 hour ago -
The average length of time between arrivals at a turnpike
toll-booth is 26 seconds. What is...
asked 2 hours ago -
(a) A piston at 6.1 atm contains a gas that occupies a volume of
3.5 L....
asked 4 hours ago -
Please answer true or false. Words
cannot be changed or added in to make it true...
asked 4 hours ago -
An empty test tube weighs 15.923 grams. Then,
MgCl2•6H2O is added into the test tube. After...
asked 4 hours ago -
Assume memory access is 10 units of time and disk access is
10000 units of time....
asked 4 hours ago -
1. Are all good samples random?
2. Magazines often report surveys giving statistics such as “63%...
asked 4 hours ago -
Under all the various types of market structures, firms
must eventually earn some economic profits for...
asked 4 hours ago -
Consider the following fitness regime for a single locus trait
with two co-dominant alleles: w11 =...
asked 4 hours ago -
A large cable company reports the following.
80% of its customers subscribe to its cable TV...
asked 4 hours ago