Barry and Iris are playing Ping-Pong. Both have equal ability, and each point comes down to whether the players guess correctly about the direction the other player will hit.
Look at the payoff matrix provided above. What is the Nash equilibrium for Barry and Iris?
Choose one:
A. Iris hits to the left and Barry guesses to the right.
B. Iris hits to the left and Barry guesses to the left.
C. There is no Nash equilibrium.
D. Iris hits to the right and Barry guesses to the right.
When Berry Guesses left ,then Iris has more pay off in Hits right. And when Berry Guesses Right, then Iris has more pay in Hits left.
Similarly, When Iris Hits left ,then Berry has more pay off in Guessing Left and When Iris hits Right ,then Berry has more pay off in Guessing Right.
Therefore, we can see that both players best response doesn't match. This implies that there is not Nash equilibrium.
Hence,option(C) is correct.
Look at the payoff matrix provided above. What is the Nash equilibrium for Barry and Iris?
Refer to the payoff matrix above. How many Nash Equilibriums this game has? 1 2 3 0 Player 2 Left Right Up 4,3 -1,-1 player 1 Down 0,0 3,4
The following payoff matrix depicts the possible outcomes for two players involved in a game of volleyball. At this point in the game, the ball has just been hit to Deidra, and she chooses whether to hit right or hit left. At the same time, Ashley chooses whether to jump right (Deidra’s right) or jump left (Deidra’s left). If a player receives a payoff of 1, the player wins the point; if the player receives a payoff of –1, the...
(Ch. 30) [Same Info] Consider the following payoff matrix. Player B Left Right Top 1,0 2,4 Player Bottom • A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies will have Player B playing Left_ _% of the time. 3,2 0,1 50
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down 2,1 2,2 In regards to Nash equilibium, we can say that: A. there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left and Up/Right B. Bottom/Right is an unstable yet social optimum, therefore a Nash equilibrium C. Bottom/Right is the only Nash equlibrium D. there are zero Nash equilibria
Again, consider the following payoff matrix: Player A Player B Left Right Up 1,1 1,2 Down 2,1 2,2 In regards to Nash equilibium, we can say that: A. there are two Nash equilibra; Down/Left and Up/Right B. Bottom/Right is an unstable yet social optimum, therefore a Nash equilibrium C. Bottom/Right is the only Nash equlibrium D. there are zero Nash equilibria
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Sam and Teresa are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Sam chooses Right and Teresa chooses Right, Sam will receive a payoff of 5 and Teresa will receive a payoff of 3. Teresa Left...
Based on the payoff matrix provided, what is the Nash equilibrium for the two suspects? Choose one: A. Lex Luther keeps quiet but Captain Cold testifies. B. Both suspects testify. C. Lex Luther testifies but Captain Cold keeps quiet. D. Both suspects keep quiet. Consider a competitive market for a consumer product. Suppose this product goes out of fashion with consumers. How will this sudden drop in popularity affect the profit of an individual firm in this market in...
1. Assume two players (ie. Florent and Bernard) compete in a one-shot simultaneous move game. Florent can choose up or down, whereas Bernard can choose left, middle or right. Assume the following payoff matrix Bernard Florent Up 6,8 3,2 Down 3.2 4.4 Payoff: (Florent, Bernard) a) Identify the dominant strategy equilibrium(s), if any. (3 marks) b) Identify the Nash equilibrium(s), if any. (3 marks) c) If the players could sign a binding contract as to the actions of each player,...
3. (30 pts) Consider the following game. Players can choose either left () or 'right' (r) The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the firat number and player B's payoff is the second number Player B Player A 4,4 1,6 r 6,1 -3.-3 (a) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. (4 pta) (b) Suppose player A chooses l with probability p and player B...
Please help me with these Econ questions!!!! Figure 4.1 Alvin Chooses Top Theodore Up Down Left 12, 12.12 14, 6,4 Right 6, 14,6 8, 8, 2 Simon Alvin Chooses Bottom Theodore Up Down Left 4, 4, 14 6,2, 6 Right 2, 6, 8 4, 4, 4 Simon Refer to Figure 4.1. Simon is the player. ⓔA.row ○B.column OC. chapter OD. page If Carla can pick more oranges in one hour than Benjamin, then Carla definitely has a comparative advantage in...