Question

(c) Suppose that Victoria and Albert are governed by emotions that they cannot cont Neither can avoid getting angry if the other does not clean. And if either one is angry, t quarrel so that the payoff of each is diminished by 2. Given that there is certain to be a quarrel if either docs not clean, the payoff matrix for the game between Victoria and Albert becomes: Vengeful Victoria and Angry Albert Victoria Clean Don't Clean 0,4 Clcan Albert Don' Clean 1,0 (d) If the other player cleans, is it better to clean or not clean? If the other player does not clean, is it better to cleau or not clean. Explain

g) and h) questions please! thanks!

Answer 1

d) If the other player cleans,is it better to clean or not clean-Clean. If the other player does not clean,is it better to clean or not clean- Not clean.

If one player does not clean,the other will get angry so there will be a quarrel whether or not the first player cleans.Given that there will be a quarrel anyways,the second player is better off not cleaning than cleaning.

e) No,it does not have a dominant strategy as the best response depends on what the other person does.

f) The two Nash Equilibrium in this game are - Both clean the room and Both do not clean the room

g) If aAlbert and Victoria both, are easy to anger there are two equilibria, One that is better for both of them and one that is worse for both of them than the equilibrium where neither gets angry and neither cleans

h)The equilibrium outcome in this case would be that Albert does not clean and Victoria does clean.Nobody starts a quarrel then.