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Please show step by step process I am confused Firm A and Firm B are two...
EC202-5-FY 10 9Answer both parts of this question. (a) Firm A and Firm B produce a homogenous good and are Cournot duopolists. The firms face an inverse market demand curve given by P 10-Q. where P is the market price and Q is the market quantity demanded. The marginal and average cost of each firm is 4 i. 10 marks] Show that if the firms compete as Cournot duopolists that the total in- dustry output is 4 and that if...
Solve step by step please 5. Suppose the demand for pizza in a small isolated town is p- 10 -Q. There are only two firms, A and B, and each has a cost function TC-2 q. Determine the Cournot equilibrium. 6. Consider a market with just one firm. The demand in the market is p a linear cost function C(Q) = 2 18-Q and the firm has a. How much output will this firm produce. What will be the profit...
Two large diversified consumer products firms (Firm A and Firm B) are about to enter the market for a new pain reliever. The two firms are very similar in terms of their costs, strategic approach, and market outlook. The market demand curve for the pain reliever is given as: P = 2 – 0.000625Q where Q = QA + QB Both firms have the same constant marginal costs of production MCA = MCB = $0.50 per bottle; and fixed costs...
of output respectively, suc. Firm 1 and Firm 2 compete as Cournot duopolists, producing q1 and q units that market output Q = q1 + q2. They face market inverse demand of P-400-20. Firm l's Total cost is given by TG, = 2q3. Finn 2's by TC2-2 . 10, what is Firm l's equilibrium profit maximizing output level, qǐ? 11. What is market output in the Cournot equilibrium for this market (so, what is the value of Q. = qi...
This is the FOURTH time I'm posting this question please post the full answer of ALL parts A,B,C,D,E. If you can't ,allow somebody else to do it.Thank you! 3. Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers, Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by: C()30q +1.5q. The markei demand for these soai covers is reprsenid by h inverse demand equation: p-300-30, where 9-+ total output a) Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity...
Consider two firms (Firm A and Firm B) competing in this market. They simultaneously decide on the price of the product in a typical Bertrand fashion while producing an identical product. Both firms face the same cost function: C(qA) = 12qA and C(qB) = 12qB, where qA is the output of Firm A and qB is the output of Firm B. The demand curve is P = 30 - Q. (i) What will be the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price (pB) chosen...
can someone help me solve/explain step by step 3) Suppose that there are only two firms in the industry for printers, HP and Xerox, making the industry a Cournot duopoly. The demand for printers is given by the equation, P = 300-4Q1-402, where P is the market price, Q1 is the quantity demanded from HP, and Q2 is the quantity demanded from Xerox. The marginal cost for each firm is constant at $60. a) Derive the equation for HP's revenue....
Questions 10-12 rely on the following prompt: Firm 1 and Firm 2 compete as Cournot duopolists, producing q1 and q2 units of output respectively, such that market output Q=q1+q2. They face market inverse demand of P = 400 − 2Q. Firm 1’s Total cost is given by TC1=2q1^2. Firm 2’s by TC2=2q2^2. 10. What is Firm 1’s equilibrium profit maximizing output level, q1*? 11. What is market output in the Cournot equilibrium for this market (so, what is the value...
PART VI. Problems. Solve the following problems. Please show your work, especially how you calculate a) marginal revenue, the b) profit maximizing quantity and price, c) the Cournot reaction function [best response functions) and the Stackelberg model. (3 points for each problem.) 33. A regulated monopoly faces the following demand for its product, P = 68 - 4Q, and has a marginal cost of MC = 20. Q is the quantity sold and P is the price. a. Under regulation,...
Please show step by step. Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P= 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this Information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round Intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm:...