In Stackleberg duopoly model the market leader is the first mover and the other firm follows sequentially.
In this model th total quantity demanded in the market is give by both firm 1 firm 2.
QD = Q1+Q2
So the price of Market = 20 - QD and the price for firm 1 = 20-Q2 and for firm 2 = 20 - Q1.
When cost for firm 2 is 16 to stop him entering into the market the quantity firm 1 should produce is Qd= 20-16= 4.
I fthe firm 2 is producing for 16$ then firm 1 should not deter him as he will be better well off to sell his product at 15$ as his cost is Zero.
Consider an industry for a homogeneous product with a single firm (firm 1) that can produce...
Consider a market where N firms produce a homogeneous product and compete by simultaneously setting quantities. The inverse demand function has the general form P PO-P(qi +q2 +q3 + + qv), where Q is total quantity produced, qi is the quantity produced by firm i and P is the market price. The demand curve is downward sloping, so P10 < 0. The total cost of firm i is given by Cig). (0) Show that P- MC qi i , where...
Consider an industry composed of four firms which produce a homogeneous good with inverse demand P(Y) 100-Y where Y - Notice that this set-up implies the firms compete in quantities. The firms have similar c(y) 20y production costs defined as a) Compute firm profits from the Nash equilibrium. b) Show that a merger between firms one and two is not profitable. c) Suppose that a merger between firms one and two will generate cost synergies s where s is a...
Question 2: Simultaneous quantity choiceTwo firms F1 and F2 produce a homogeneous product and compete on the same market. The market price is described by the inverse demand curveP= 11−2Q, where Q is total industry output andPis the market price. To keep things simple, suppose that each firm can produce either 1 or 2 units (these are the only possible choices of production).Further suppose that both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to 2, so that the total cost...
6. (6 pts) In a Stackelberg model of quantity competition, firm 1 moves first by commiting to a level of output, and firm 2 moves second after observing firm 1's choice. The market inverse demand curve is given by: P = 110-Q and the firms' cost structures are given by: CQ) K10Q where Kis a fixed cost of production (a Suppos A = 0. Find the quantities and profits for each firm in the subgame perfect Nash equiibru. (4 pts)...
= Consider an industry consisting of two firms which produce a homogeneous commodity. The industry demand function is Q = 100 – P, where Q is the quantity demanded and P is its price. The total cost functions are given as C1 = 50q1 for firm 1, and C2 = 60qz for firm 2, where Q 91 +92. a. (6 points) Suppose both firms are Cournot duopolists. Find and graph each firm's reaction function. What would be the equilibrium price,...
Consider a homogeneous product industry with inverse demand function p-35 -Q a) Assume that the industry is initially monopolized by an incumbent firm (firm I) which has the exclusive right to use the state-of-the-art technology summarized by the total cost function C-10q. Find the initial monopoly equilibrium (price, quantity, industry profit, consumer surplus and total surplus) and the associated degrees of concentration (Herfindahl index) and market power (Lerner index) b) Assume now that a new firm (firm N) discovers and...
Consider a homogeneous product industry with inverse demand function p-35 -Q a) Assume that the industry is initially monopolized by an incumbent firm (firm I) which has the exclusive right to use the state-of-the-art technology summarized by the total cost function C-10q. Find the initial monopoly equilibrium (price, quantity, industry profit, consumer surplus and total surplus) and the associated degrees of concentration (Herfindahl index) and market power (Lerner index) b) Assume now that a new firm (firm N) discovers and...
1.Consider an industry with only two firms that produce identical products. Each of the firms only incurs a fixed cost of $1000 to produce and marginal cost is 20. The market demand function is as follows: Q=q1+q2=400-P a. Assuming that the firms form a cartel, calculate the profit-maximizing quantity of output, price and profits b. If the firms choose to behave as in the Cournot model, what would be the profit- maximizing quantities of output, price and profits? c. if...
3) Suppose that an industry consists of two firms that produces a homogeneous product. Suppose that each firm decides how much to produce and assumes that its rival will not alter its level of production in response (Cournot Model). The industry demand equation is: P 145 5(Q1+ Q2) where Qland Q2 represents the output of Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively. The total cost equations of the two firms are: TCF 3Q1 and TCF 5Q2 A, Calculate each firm's Best...
1. Consider a market of homogeneous products in which firms compete on quantity. Demand in this market is given by q(p) = 72 - 6p: (1) There are both an incumbent firm M and a potential entrant E which can both produce the good at marginal costs 6. Prior to entry, E must incur an entry cost equal to Ce ≥ 0. (a) Suppose that Ce = 1. What are the equilibrium price, quantity for each firm, and profit for...