1. The following is the extensive-form representation (omitting payoffs) of a game: ·N = {1, 2,...
Question 1 Consider the following extensive-form game. y R 2 А/ B 1,3 ay 1,-1 3,-2 2,-1 4,-2 1. What are the possible strategies of Player 1? 2. Write the game in normal form. 3. Solve this game using backward induction.
Question 2 Consider the following extensive form game. R 2 a А/ B 2,3 / 1 \ь 3, x 3,0 1, Each value of x defines a different game. 1. Solve this game by backward induction for x = 0 and for x = 2. For each of those values of x, what are the payoffs that player 2 can get in the solution? 2. Write this game in Normal form (The table can have an entry of the form...
Problem 1. Consider the following extensive form game. 2 > 2,3 4,1 3,2 1.2 (a) By converting the game into normal form game (by finding the corre- sponding bimatrix game), find all Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) Does player 2 have a strictly dominated strategy?
Problem 2.(20 points) Consider the following game: In the first step, Alice has two $10 bills and can take one of the following two actions: (i) she can give S20 to Bob or (ii) she can give one of the S10 bills to Bob. All the money will be used to buy popcorns before the movie they will see. Each one dollar of popcorn gives one unit of payoff for the player who buys it. In the second step, they...
Problem 2.(20 points) Consider the following game: In the first step, Alice has two $10 bills and can take one of the following two actions: (i) she can give S20 to Bob or (ii) she can give one of the S10 bills to Bob. All the money will be used to buy popcorns before the movie they will see. Each one dollar of popcorn gives one unit of payoff for the player who buys it. In the second step, they...
Consider the following extensive-form game with two players, 1
and 2.
a). Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. [8
Marks]
b). Find the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of the
game. [6 Marks]
c). Derive the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
If players play this mixed Nash equilibrium in the subgame, would 1
player In or Out at the initial mode? [6 Marks]
[Hint: Write down the normal-form of the subgame and derive the
mixed Nash equilibrium of...
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information: 2 In 0 (a) (Level A) Write down the normal form associated with this extensive formm game (b) (Level A) First suppose = 0. Find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game. (c) (Level B) Again suppose α-0. Find a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this extensive form game that is not subgame perfect. (d) (Level B) Now suppose α = 3. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equi- libria....
1. Consider the following extensive form game with perfect information 1 Out 2 2 In 3 3 a) (Level A) Write down the normal form associated with this extensive form game (b) (Level A) First suppose -0. Find a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game (c) (Level B) Again suppose α-0. Find a pure strategy ash equilibrium of this extensive form game that is not subgame perfect (d) (Level B) Now suppose a-3. Find all pure strategy subgame perfect equi-...