Game theory
Person 1 cares about her income and person 2’s income. Precisely, the value she attaches to each unit of her own income is the same as the value she attaches to any 5 units of person 2’s income. Is there a payoff function consistent with these preferences. Give an example of such a function, if exists.
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Game Theory: Will rate for correct and descriptive answers! 3) Suppose that we have a game...
Game Theory:
Will rate for correct and descriptive answers!
3) Suppose that we have a game where Si-H, Land S,-(X, Y}. If player I plays H, then her payoff is z regardless of player 2's choice. Player l's other payoff numbers are uI(L,X)-0 and u (L,Y) 10. You can make up any payoff numbers you like for player 2 (we are only concerned with player I's payoff for this question). a. Draw the normal form of this game. Clearly label...
So, for the first question, the two Best Response functions I got are: BR1=25/t2 || BR2=25/(1-t)2 For the second question ("How much will each individual's dinner be worth at the Nash eqbm?...
So, for the first question,
the two Best Response functions I got are:
BR1=25/t2 ||
BR2=25/(1-t)2
For the second question ("How much will each individual's dinner
be worth at the Nash eqbm?"), I got that
P1=BR1 and P2=BR2 (i.e
the prices were the Best Reponse functions).
Is this correct? I'm just confused as I'm not sure why the
question would contain two parts which have the same answer. Are
the Nash Equilibrium prices always the same as the Best Response...
operarions research game theory problem please explain every step 15.2-7.* Two politicians soon wil be starting th...
operarions research game theory problem please explain every
step
15.2-7.* Two politicians soon wil be starting their campaigns against each other for a certain political office. Each must now se lect the main issue she will emphasize as the theme of her cam paign. Each has three advantageous issues from which to choose, but the relative effectiveness of each one would depend upon the issue chosen by the opponent. In particular, the estimated increase in the vote for politician 1...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an...
Second Price sealed bid-auction: Assume n players are bidding in an auction in order to obtain an indivisible object. Denote by vi the value player i attaches to the object; if she obtains the object at the price p her payoff is vi −p. Assume that the players’ valuations of the object are all different and all positive; number the players 1 through n in such a way that v1 > v2 > · · · > vn > 0....
4. Boris and Natasha agree to play the following game. They will flip a coin 5...
4. Boris and Natasha agree to play the following game. They will flip a coin 5 times in a row. They will compute S = ( number of heads H – number of tails T). a) Boris will pay Natasha S. Graph Natasha’s payoff as a function of S. What is the expected value of S? b) How much should Natasha be willing to pay Boris to play this game? After paying this amount, what is her best case and...
Boris and Natasha agree to play the following game. They will flip a (fair) coin 5...
Boris and Natasha agree to play the following game. They will flip a (fair) coin 5 times in a row. They will compute S = (number of heads H – number of tails T). a) Boris will pay Natasha S. Graph Natasha’s payoff as a function of S. What is the expected value of S? b) How much should Natasha be willing to pay Boris to play this game? After paying this amount, what is her best case and worst...
QUESTION 8 Consider a game with two players, players and player 2. Player 1's strategies are...
QUESTION 8 Consider a game with two players, players and player 2. Player 1's strategies are up and down, and player 2's strategies are left and right. Suppose that player 1's payoff function is such that for any combination of the players chosen strategies, player 1 always receives a payoff equal to 0. Suppose further that player 2's payoff function is such that no two combinations of the players' chosen strategies ever give player 2 the same payoff Choose the...
Fit to page Page view A Re 2. Basket A contains 5 apples and 1 orange....
Fit to page Page view A Re 2. Basket A contains 5 apples and 1 orange. Basket B contains 1 apple and 5 oranges. Basket C contains 3 apples and 3 oranges. Assume throughout that tastes are monotonic. On Monday, Anne is offered a choice between basket A and C, and she chooses A. On Tuesday, she is offered a choice between basket B and C, and she chooses B. a) Graph these baskets on a graph with apples on...
2. Julia's intertemporal preferences are represented by a utility function with hyperbolic discounting with parameters B-0.6...
2. Julia's intertemporal preferences are represented by a utility function with hyperbolic discounting with parameters B-0.6 and -0.9. Julia's instantaneous utility is as follows for any amount of money Sm, her instantaneous utility at any date t is u,(m) -Vm. A time period represents a year. (a) Today Julia is given a choice between receiving $100 in 3 years' time or $400 in 5 years' time. What does she choose? (b) After 3 years Julia is asked to either confirm...
Sterling is out to purchase bottles of vodka (q1) and black turtlenecks (q2). The price of...
Sterling is out to purchase bottles of vodka (q1) and black turtlenecks (q2). The price of vodka is p1 = 4 and the price of turtlenecks is p2 = 1. However, the store also offers a bulk discount on vodka: after purchasing the first 5 bottles, any additional bottles purchased are 50% off (for example, 8 bottles of vodka and 8 turtlenecks would cost 4 × 5 + 2 × 3 + 2 × 8 = 42). Assume Sterling starts...
Game Theory:
Will rate for correct and descriptive answers!
3) Suppose that we have a game where Si-H, Land S,-(X, Y}. If player I plays H, then her payoff is z regardless of player 2's choice. Player l's other payoff numbers are uI(L,X)-0 and u (L,Y) 10. You can make up any payoff numbers you like for player 2 (we are only concerned with player I's payoff for this question). a. Draw the normal form of this game. Clearly label...
So, for the first question,
the two Best Response functions I got are:
BR1=25/t2 ||
BR2=25/(1-t)2
For the second question ("How much will each individual's dinner
be worth at the Nash eqbm?"), I got that
P1=BR1 and P2=BR2 (i.e
the prices were the Best Reponse functions).
Is this correct? I'm just confused as I'm not sure why the
question would contain two parts which have the same answer. Are
the Nash Equilibrium prices always the same as the Best Response...
operarions research game theory problem please explain every
step
15.2-7.* Two politicians soon wil be starting their campaigns against each other for a certain political office. Each must now se lect the main issue she will emphasize as the theme of her cam paign. Each has three advantageous issues from which to choose, but the relative effectiveness of each one would depend upon the issue chosen by the opponent. In particular, the estimated increase in the vote for politician 1...
QUESTION 8 Consider a game with two players, players and player 2. Player 1's strategies are up and down, and player 2's strategies are left and right. Suppose that player 1's payoff function is such that for any combination of the players chosen strategies, player 1 always receives a payoff equal to 0. Suppose further that player 2's payoff function is such that no two combinations of the players' chosen strategies ever give player 2 the same payoff Choose the...
Fit to page Page view A Re 2. Basket A contains 5 apples and 1 orange. Basket B contains 1 apple and 5 oranges. Basket C contains 3 apples and 3 oranges. Assume throughout that tastes are monotonic. On Monday, Anne is offered a choice between basket A and C, and she chooses A. On Tuesday, she is offered a choice between basket B and C, and she chooses B. a) Graph these baskets on a graph with apples on...
2. Julia's intertemporal preferences are represented by a utility function with hyperbolic discounting with parameters B-0.6 and -0.9. Julia's instantaneous utility is as follows for any amount of money Sm, her instantaneous utility at any date t is u,(m) -Vm. A time period represents a year. (a) Today Julia is given a choice between receiving $100 in 3 years' time or $400 in 5 years' time. What does she choose? (b) After 3 years Julia is asked to either confirm...
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